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In this paper the problem within the Navy of optimising shipboard
supporting material through improved inventory management techniques is
discussed. The optimization referred to is the ability of shipboard
material inventories to support a Navy ship for long periods of time and
away from all sources of supply* These inventories must be calculated
within space and budgetary constraints. The question, then, is how does
the Navy accomplish this task and thereby optimize and ensure that stocks
of shipboard material will be sufficient to maintain s ship's self-
sufficiency, a high state of material dependability and readiness to
accomplish its assigned mission.
This paper, in effect a case study, discusses the programs and
policies adopted by the United States Navy since the end of World War IX
to achieve the goal of optimizing shipboard supporting material. In
Chapter I the parameters of the problem are discussed in terms of The
Ship, The Personnel and The Organization. Chapter II traces and describes
the major programs implemented prior to August, 1964. The issuance of a
Navy-Wide Supply Support Policy by the Chief of Naval Operations in
August, 1964 and the programs spawned by this policy are discussed in
Chapter III. Chapter IV includes an overall summary of the progress
attained by the Navy in achieving optimization of shipboard supporting
material with additional comments by the author.
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The research methodology employed Is mainly the use of reference
materials of a secondary nature. Previous research reports, inventory
management textbooks and articles froo professional periodicals constitute
the bulk of the bibliography. However, the use and aid of unpublished
materials and personal interviews is also included.
X would like to acknowledge the cooperation and help received from
the various offices within the Navy Department and specifically from the
Provisioning, Allowance and Load List Division of the Bureau of Supplies
and Accounts headed by Cdr. T. J. Allshouse, SC, US1I.
In addition my thanks go to Dr. J. Hart Walters, Jr. for his
advice and counsel in the writing of this paper.
iv

PREFAC- • •.•*.•••..*... Hi
Chopto?
USB PABAMETSSS OP TUB PROBLSH 1
The ajraoaaal
The Organisation
IX MAJOR PROCKAHS PRIOR TO AUGUS?, 1&64 23
Coordinated Shipboard Allowance List (GOSAL)
Military Essentiality Coding CISC)
. : MAJOR PROGRAMS A2TER AUGUST, i96»r* 52









THE PARAMETERS OF THE PROBLEM
The Ship
The mission of the United States Navy is to control the sea at ail
times in support of the national policy. The accomplishment of this mission
must be effected through the use of ships. The ships cannot be expected to
fulfill their assigned tasks without a well trained and proficient craw.
The crew must have available the resources with which to apply their pro-
ficiency in ensuring the meeting of the ship's commitments. The resources
of a material nature include fuel, food, water, physical comfort items and
all classes of spare parts used by the crew in making the ship a dependable
and useful element of the Navy. The basic premise of a ship's utility is
its ability to be mobile. It must be able to get underway before any of its
myriad tasks can be accomplished. Once it does get underway the operating
dependability of its parts must be guaranteed. This can be done by placi
adequate replacements for the machinery and weapons on board the ship so that
properly trained and qualified personnel are able to repair these components
without assistance from the shore. If t ire no constraints on space
or funds it would be a simple matter to carry a spare part for every re-
quiring component and thereby guarantee that no breakdown within the physi-
cal capacity of the ship to repair it would occur for lack of a part.

The constraints of space and funds, however, are real. In partic-
ular, funding of shipboard repair parts is the more stringent. There must
be a method, than, of deciding within the constraints the proper range and
depth of repair parts that should be carried on a ship of the United States
Navy to maximize its dependability in carrying out the mission assigned.
This paper will attempt to review past, present and future techniques ap-
plied in the United States Navy to solving this complex problem.
The ship is the basic ingredient of the problem. The age of the
Navy's ships is varied. In this paper ships will be classified into two
broad categories, pre-Korean vintage and post-Korean vintage. This admit-
tedly is over-simplified but will allow a more cohesive view of the two
groups
.
The pre-Korean vintage ships were for the most part constructed
during World War II. The ships were built on an assembly-line basis and
the machinery installed within them was acquired from any and all sources.
Ships built in the same shipyard and from the same plans would be launched
with internal machinery requiring repair parts that were not interchange-
able. This did not cause any problem at that time. The ships were given
an allowance list and the monetary constraint being absent they carried
with them the necessary repair parts peculiar to the ship. Allowance lists
i
for shipboard repair parts were used in the Navy prior to World War II.
They were maintained properly and were no doubt valuable in accomplishing
J. E. Hamilton, Shipboard Environment of Logistics . The George
Washington University Logistics Research Project, Serial T-107/60,
September 21, I960, p. 34.

the job of optimizing the ship's dependability in terms of available repair
parts. The ships constructed during World War II did indeed start with an
allowance li3t and with repair parts peculiar and necessary to continued
dependable operation. The tempo and pressure of the operations involved
in the war, however, soon caused the abandonment of the allowance list. If
a part was needed it was requisitioned by the ship and in turn supplied by
the shore establishment. If the part had not been on the original allowance
list no up-dating of the document was made. J. £. Hamilton describes the
situation thus:
Allowance lists fell into disrepute. In-excess (of allowance)
requisitions fell into disuse. The operating system could not
justifiably enforce the rules in regard to either because it was
recognised that to do so could hamper ships to a dangerous extent.
The only practicable rule was tacitly to accept that the true
responsibility was where it had always been — within the ships —
and, wherever possible, if a ship asked for something to let it
have it. 2
As the war progressed more sophisticated weapons were added to
these ships. There was no intention of adding then to the allowance list.
Each new component was to be supported by a box of repair parts whose
contents had been decided upon by the designers and engineers. Their
decisions were based upon mathematical predictions of the probability of
failure without the benefit of usage data. These boxes of repair par.
were usually stored in proximity to the component or equipment. If this
were not feasible the boxes were placed so that they were "not in the way
It came to pass with the change of personnel that the contents of these
boxes were not known. The location of the boxes was not known. The al-
lowance lists were out-dated or non-existent. Repair parts when required
2
Ibid ., p. 35.

were usually ctly from the shore establishment or bartered
fr' r ships. This was the condition of shipboard Repair Part Support
at the close of tfa r II.
TI ie post-ivorld War II chaos of shipboard
repei- > shall be covered in detail in Chapter II. These same pre-
Korean vintage ship3 are still or jy constitute i large popula-
tion of the ace .. It is true that they now have up-to-date allow-
ance lists. It :o true that many of these 23 plus year veterans are
encountering e tuiproeaC failures despite ..'. thorough o lis
and interim maintenance periods. The breakdowns ari>. occurri.. pments
replacement parts that were not supposed to be replaced. Tliis
supposition was predicted on the designers' and engineers' estimates during
World War II. .:3timatas were never intended to endure for over 20
years. Ther Lfl Hi authorised allowance for these repair parts. Since
there has & demand for *:s over the years it is
not carried in ti*e Navy's Supply System. The ship in need of this part is
faced with two immediate alternatives. If the part required is needed to
ir an equipment essential to the ship's present mission and it is not
on-board nor known to be a stocked item 3 then it must be acquired by
trig or stripping a similar equipment from an inactive ship or procured
locally from a known commercial source . If tliis cannot be done the part is
ordered by the ship through the Supply System.
In many cases the original manufacturer of the equipment has long
since gone out oi business. If tie is still in business he usually will have
to tool up and uai«e i special order. This requires contract negotiation,

high costs and worst o£ all, an intolerable time-span between the ship's
requisition and receipt of the part on board. This same part that might
have originally cost $5 in the 1940* s will cost up to $1000 today. The
ship may or may not be forced to abort its mission while awaiting Che part
or depend on the ingenuity of its crew to use available alternative equip-
ments in the interim. The latter is usually more common. The natural re-
action of the ship'u crew is to order at least two of these parts so that
this situation will not reoccur. It is true that they add these parts to
their allowance list but it is also true that they may not need them for
another 20 years. This practice has been justified in the past in terms of
insurance. These parts are defined as insurance items. It is easy to say
that occurrence of this situation on a pre-Kore-an vintage ship many times a
year will soon increase the inventory carried by the ship in terms of both
cube and investment. The constraints of space and funds preclude this
practice indefinitely.
The Navy Department, including Chief of Naval Operations, Fleet Com-
manders, Type commanders and the commanding officers of ships, has been
involved in the solving of this problem.^ in a Staff Study conducted by a
Type Commander^ the following information was revealed. Five ships were
studied over a two year period. These ships were of the same class and
type. Their operating characteristics over the period of the study were sim-
ilar. They were all of the pre-Korean vintage. The study analysed the usage
•'See Appendix A for detailed explanation of Command Relationships.
^Unpublished study conducted by the Force Supply Officer for







of repair parts on the respective allowance lists. The usage data was so
iar that it was av with the following results:
a. Repair Parts Allowed and On-board
(Individual Allowance list items
referred to as Line Items.)
b. Line Items indicating sero demand
c. Line Items indicating one demand
in two fmt 2,500 $ 45,000
d. Line Items indicating one demand
in 90 days 750 $ 12,000*
e. Line Items indicating more than
one demand in 90 d 250 $ Lj,000
*Hot including category "a."
There is strong evidence to emphasise the quantity and investment the Navy
lias in insurance items. This study was limited statistically in length of
observation and per cent of population sampled, but it does underline and
picture the slow shipboard inventory turnover rate. It substantiates the
growing concern with increasing dead stock. The vital question that frames
the problem of shipboard inventory management is: How much insurance can
we afford;
The nature of the problem as it concerns post-Korean vintage ships
is not the absolute difference in ship construction but the facts of
political and economic life as they affect construction of Navy ships
day and in the future.
Unlike ships built under the World War II construction techniques,
today's ships are contracted for and built as single units. There may be

15 to 20 snips of one class programmed, but there are actually only two or
three under construction at any one time. The Department of Defense procures
many major items in quantities of hundreds or thousands, all made to the same
general specifications. Ship construction and acquisition is not accom-
plished by mass production techniques but is characterized by unit production
extending over 3 to 4 years. The basic disparitias in equipments installed
in post-Korean vintage ships are still occurring, out for a different reason;
Due to the Navy Department's effort to promote maximum price com-
petition in the shipbuilding industry, all potential suppliers in
most instances are separately solicited on each component as required
during the construction of each ship. While the supplier's delivery
time is considered in the purchase award, the shipbuilder's prime
consideration in the selection of the successful bidder is the lowest
acquisition purchase price. LMI could find no evidence that consider
tion is given to the impact the item will have upon the 'on-board'
support of the ship, or on the life cost and effect on the total Navy
system stock.
5
The newest Navy ship is still afflicted by the same support problems af-
flicting her aging sisters. There is little or no commonality of parts
among similar class new construction ships. The initial allowance of
repair parts to support the ship is provided by the low-bidding supplier,
who may or may not be in business whan additional repair parts are required.
The pre-occupation of the Department of Defense with price competition often
benefits the shipbuilding contractor more than it does the Navy. A low
initial cost may prove to be "penny-wisa and pound-foolish 1 ' over the life
of a ship. The use of performance specifications in the purchase of ship-
board equipments instead of standard material specifications further com-
pounds the on-board support problem. The performance specification allows
•^Logistic Management Institute, Study of Ships On-Board Repair
Parts Outfitting and Revision of the Present Associated Supply Aids ,
Task 65-13, July 6, 1965, p. 7.
I
manufacturers to comply by producing similar but not compatible equip-
ments which therefore must be supported as if they were completely different
systems . This not only requires different on-board repair parts but dif-
ferent maintenance manuals also . This in turn complicates standardisation
of technical maintenance training throughout the tlavy.
The majority of equipments in a ship are supported by repair parts
classified as Hull, Mechanical and Electrical. These HM&E repair parts are
listed in one allowance list. The present policy of procurement for ship-
board equipments causes each ship's HM&E supported equipments to become
individual systems in term3 of continued supply support. Tlie Logistics
Management Institute in its recent study of this area illustrated that:
33% of the Navy's installed IZM&H equipments being supported
with on-board as well as system stock inventories, arc peculiar
to one hull. Further, 50% of these equipments are peculiar to
three or less hulls. 6
These facts were developed for LMI by the Navy Ships Parts Control Center
and confirmed by the Bureau of Ships. LHZ made a detailed study to deter-
mine the degree of standardisation in terms of continued supply for newly
constructed ships of the same class. Four types of ships were given a
detailed study to determine the similarity of installed equipments. A
sample of two or three ships within each type was used with the following
criteria for selection:
1. The ships were of the same class, built to a common Bureau
of Ship's plan or specification.




3. Ships were constructed at two or more different shipyards,
Navy and commercial.
4. Certain ships were selected to be representative of ship-
yards in the same geographic area.
5. Certain ships were selected to be representative of ship-
yards in different geographic areas separated by large
distances
.
The comparison of installed a {Uip.tmts within hulls of a given
class of ships showed that the e [uipments pecul iar to the two or
three ships in the sample ranged from a
,




The more hulls included in the sample the less commonality of a juip-
raants for all ships compared becomes, rather rapidly compounding the
parts peculiar situation.'
In view of this large percentage of peculiar equipments the LSI! study
conducted a comparison by Federal Stock Number of repair parts on the
ship's Hull, Mechanical and Electrical allowance list. They found that:
. . . many items were peculiar to but one ship of its class. In
fact, the peculiar parts ranged from a low of 32.7% to a high of
46.1% in the classes of ships sampled. Again, the more ships in-
cluded in the samples, the smaller the complete commonality between
the parts support loads .6
This study translates into facts and figures what has already been
known intuitively by the Navy and the people who are charged with the
responsibility of ensuring a ship's materia^ . :aility. Without this
reliability the Navy is faced with a continuing material support problem
tliac can only lead to present and future degradation of a combatant ship's
mission readiness, both potential and actual.







vintage ships. The lack of equipment standardisation is common to both.
The constraints on spacG and funds available to store and procure on-board
repair parts arc also common. The allowance lists on all Navy ships today
o
are up-to-date and under continuous scrutiny. The one other major segment
of this ship-orientac supply support probleu is .aand by the ship for
repair parts not designated in the allowance list as allowed nor carried
on-board in excess of allowance. These items of repair parts are classified
as Not Carried (NC). The NC items are identified by a Federal Stock Number
(FSN) or by the manufacturer's part number. They may be listed on an allow-
ance list for information purposes or they may be listed in the manufacture:
taaintcnance manual fo: . ipment involved. The NC items are not on-
board due to lack of previous need or because they may be too expensive to
justify shipboard stocking.
In order to understand more clearly the demand characteristics of
NC repair parts the Commander, Cruisers Destroyers, U. S. Atlantic Fleet
conducted a 15 month study of this problem as it affected 198 destroyer
type ships. In coordination with the Bureau of Supplies and Accounts and
the Navy Supply Depot, Newport, R. I., this study commenced ou January 1,
1904 and concluded on liarch 31, 1965. Cociaander Cruisers Destroyers, U. S.
Atlantic Fleet (CCEXRuDSSLANT) was chosen to conduct this study due to
their system of .ing the NC repair part problem in an aggressive
manner. Aboard CGCCRuDCSLANT destroyers chare is a system that operst
to react to Not Carried repair part demands. As soon as a ship h
9
See Chap t«..:r II for discussion of the procedures involved in
allowance list construction and implementation.
;
li
overhaul, a file is started for demanded items which are not in the ship's
allowance list. If any item in this file receives a second demand, the
item is added to the allowance list; its descriptive card is than removed
from the file. When the ship retum3 for overhaul, this file is destroyed
and a new one started. The Bureau of Suppl- counts requested that
COMCRUDESLANT compile the NC demand data ia such a manner so as to build
demand frequency distribution. There were a total of 44,000 cards analysed.
Thc3e cards were divided in ax> set3: Manufacturer Part Numbered Items and
Federal Stocl; Number Items . They were fed into a computer with the fol-
lowing results:
TABLE 1
















16 - 20 50
21 - 30 40
31 - 50 14
Over 50
*Source: ALEAND unpublished Working Memorandum 66 of July 26, 1965.
Subject: Use of Destroyer Demand for "Not Carried" Items to Improve COSAL
•
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Hiis study shows that over 50 per cent of parts demanded only had a £r
4uency of onu. The pcoulou is one ox vast range to support peculiar demands.
The ipMltfim titan arises, iiow can the Navy maintain its material readiness
in light o£ the anoraity of the repair part support problem; Tiie answer
lies in the otiter half of the overall problem of Inventory Management of
Shipboard Repair Parts, the people factor. The essential element, the un-
predictable element, and the saving element of any ship is its crew. The




Tlie ship is an inanimate machine until it is given a crew. The
crew consists of officers and men of varying technical skills and depth
of experience. The crew cocaes aboard a new ship in increments dependent
on the time involved in various phases of construction. Only on a new ship
is the crew in its entirety a novice til terras of knowing tfee ship.
After completion of construction oad the official cociaissxoning of
the ship, the perscxsnel, the individuals embarked and assigned to the ship,
will begin the sociological enperien. .. in the and shall make them a
1 in fact.
Tiie ship than commences a series of post-construction gfeakm diWU
cruises. These cruises enable the personnel, from the captain to the seaman,
to learn the idiosyncrasi^.i ;>f their ship. Tliey steam her nt full speed,
they steam her in reverse, they run her machinery, they note the design
tax&a that au ear&sct A they begin to think of the ship as "she"
and each other as "shipmates." Tlie construction phase ends when the captain
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of die ship certifiea that it is ready for sea. The ship is then assigned
to an underway training group. Weeks of operational drills are conducted
with the personnel acting as a team. There .an drills in seamanship,
drills conducted to siailate battle damage and hundreds of drills to test
and train tlie - tnachinery in order to achieve ft cohesive Will co-
ordinated fighting unit. Upon completion of this underway training the
ship reports to its Type Coaja&nder for c ..Ly gad is assigned t: .ladron
as part of the active fleet. The personnel, the individuals ass
now a crew. TLiey lutow each other as to uueus aai goals and wliat is jvea
ore important they are beginning to knot? their ship. They are learning
what she can co and &* ttfcM to ensure will continue to iunc-
tion. The sailor in the Engineering Department lenows that a certain pump
requires more lubricant than the manufacturer has specified. Iki knows
that without it the pump will burn out its bearings. The manufacturer
has made hundreds of these pumps and this one is an exception in its
lubricating requirements. Why? There is no absolute answer but it is
vital that the sailor who maintains it be knowledgeable of its thirst.
The radarman has come to know that his radar burns up i power
tube al double tlvi manufacturer's predicted rate. radioman, likewise,
is aware of the extraordinary consumption of coils r u by his radio.
These men and all the met agin to know what it takes
in die way of Material to keep their mac Lag . . IIor
knows the '3 store only sells cigar '. at pre-set
hours and knowir., is euough 1 it is op. last
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hia until he can get to the store again, lie keeps the extra cigarettes in
his locker uith soap and racer blades . la the MM way the sailor knows
that the parts required by his machinery are not always available and he
oust hoard them against this eventuality.
In a siiip, as in any unit of endeavor, there is the forma! organir
tion and the informal organization. The formal shipboard supply organisation
is the Supply Department. The head of this department, the Supply Officer,
is a member of the Navy Supply Corps. The Supply Department is charged
with responsibilities of logistical support of the ship from shipboard
sources. The Supply Officer is the man who must produce Che needed material
no matter where the ship may be and whenever the material is needed. This
material is divided into three major categories: Repair Parts, Consumables
and Equipage. These categories are not always clear cut and there is often
misunderstanding in which category certain material belongs. In this paper
Repair Parts is defined as that material which is required in maintaining
or repairing machinery, installed or portable, and whose physical character-
istics would not be considered Consumable. Consumables are defined as
materials that MB Mt directly related to machinery support and which
typically are physically consumed by the user. The exception to this would
be an equipment related consumable such as a prefabricated gasket or special
paint for a specific equipment. Equipage encompasses all material not
covered in the previous categories and r lectronic test equipment,
typewriters, lifejackets, and binoculars down to the ship's official seal.
The Supply Officer in most submar ..lineswaepers , landing ships




The formal shipboard supply systera ensures that the pr ianti-
•3 of Repair Parts, Consumables and Equipage are on board at all times
and available for issue . ^r they are needed. The material il cfcoc':ed
in bins and drawers within storerooms xinder the custody of the Supply
Officer. If a sailor requires material froa one of these storerooms lie
must 30 through one of the following procedure. In this example a sailor
requires some rags. IJe requests them from his immediate supervisor, a
first class petty officer, in the form of « storeroom ra . The first
class potty officer approves the request by initialing it and the sailor
takes it to the division chief Who approves it similarly. Then he goes to
the department officer for final approval ml judget entry. The desir
item is chargeable to the department's quarterly budget and therefore must
receive approval from the department head or hi3 designated representative.
The sailor then can present the approved requisition to the storeroom store-
keeper and receive his rags. This is the way the formal supply system works.
A variation of this system is use of department credit cards to draw material
from the storeroom. These cards are held by the department head and a few
designated persons within the department. The sailor must go to one of
these people to get the card and thence his rags. One can understand why
a sailor that used rags daily would not want to go through this hierarchy
very often.
The sailor requisitions a sufficient quantity of rags on one trip
to the storeroom to preclude frequent trips. lie then finds a locker that
he alone has access to and keeps his supply of rags in it. He now has what
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J. E. Hamilton11 refers to as the first echelon of supply in the informal
shipboard supply system. There are other similar items in the locker 3uch
as brightwork polish, XI ndtools and hundreds more. Similarly the
division lias a locker th :he domain of t: :£ petty officer. la
locker will be found log -entities of rags, brightwork polish and
line. Additionally there is a wider range of articles and material re-
flc prior and future needs of the division in accomplishing its
jobs. If a sailor can't find what he needs in his own locker he has ready
access to the division locker. The department head does not like to be
dependent upon I S.?ply Officer fo; eeds and feels he can more
lily control his resources by stocking the no nd&d items in the
department's own storeroom. In this storeroom will be large quantities of
paint, automatic and hand tools and literally tons of lins, rope cable and
foul log
.
The informal supply system is fi::ed within each department. The
difference is only la the location of "greedy access storerooms" and in
ective contents . The sailor in the E . '. Department stores
ititias of lubricant close to his pump, alonr* with spare parts, tools
and any d. -.lpporting materials. The rad. t least six per
tubes in a cabinet close to his radar. % ioman also has his coils
close to his equipment . These stores ere pj d through zach department
and constitute an imposing source of supply
.
Directives are received from all levels decrying this practice and
pointing to the damage incurred to the formal supply system in terms of
11J. E. Hamilton, op. cit ., p. 7.
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inaccurate usago data generated by this procedure. The importance of central
inventory control and issue is stressed over and over. The crew understands,
but the inforaal system persists. When asked why he oust keep his power
tubes close to his radar, the radarman answers that the time involved in
drawing one tube froia supply is too long, considering the importance of
the radar to the ship's safety. In the seme vein cooes the response from
radioman. The sailor with his rags cannot abide expending half of every
day to draw a handful of rags. The intent of all these men is one th.
should not be changed. They era trying to gat their jobs done and done well
so that the ship can perform the way she was built to perform.
The idea that the informal supply system is not detrimental to
overall ship readiitess has many supporters. They ask, what is the harm of
a pyramid of supply throughout the ship if it was originally requisitioned
through the formal supply system? There is logic to this point of view and
there would be no harm if wiiat is purported were an actuality. If all
material (Repair Parts, Consumables and equipage) were in fact R .ioaed
from the Supply Department storerooms or were recorrf material
bought by the Supply Department for use by another department on a direcc-
turnover (DTO) basis there would be no liarm. would be usage data
generated with which the Supply Officer could project future requirements.
Since Consumables are not stocked in accordance with an allowance list but
on a usage and frequency of demand basis, there would be fewer stockouts and
less overstocking of Consumables. The allowance list restraints pertaining
to Repair Parts could be adjusted . ^uired to meat the
realities of the ship's needs. The informal supply system would facilitate
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distribution within tin and reduce the day-to-day load on the Supply
Department. This would all come about and be an accepted way of life if it
were not for the one fly in the ointment — money. Money makes the informal
supply system a diluter of the formal supply machinery and erodes the con-
cept of central shipboard inventory control and supply distribution.
TSie erosion takes place over long periods of time in the manner of
a barter system. The ship l-eceives money on a quarterly basis from the
Type Commander. This money is then allocated to the departments . The de-
partments never have enough money to satisfy the depth of demand required
by the informal supply system. As a result, a sailor will enter the grey
market of Wavy supply. The symbol of this bartering arena is the can of
coffee. The radarman cannot get the power tubes in the quantities he
ires or thinks lie requires with the funds available to him through his
department. He is aware that lie can get these tubes by trading five pounds
of coffee to a shipyard electronic repairman. The radarman is a close
friend of the ship's cook and soon the transaction is made. If coffee is
not available other commodities arc substituted. This type of transaction
occurs throughout all levels and in all departments of the informal supply
system. No record appears of these transactions in the formal shipboard
supply system. The result is that, in the case of the power tubes, the
Supply Department records no demand on these power tubes over many months.
Since there is no demand tliey may be transferred to another ship or turned
in ashore for monetary credit , The first time the formal supply system
receives a request for these power tubes is in the middle of the ocean
»
during a typljoon, when the radar is the most vital equipment aboard. The
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radanaan has e:diau3ted his informal storerooo, and being separated frost
the grey market must turn to the formal system for support. The support
is not there and then the excitement commences Kadio messages fly in all
directions with emergency requisitions for the power tubes and the supply
department is blamed for failing in its mission. It has failed, due to
the ingenuity and aggressiveness of the American sailor.
This situation is an exaggeration, but when the compound results of
the informal supply system are inflicted on the formal system, material sup-
port over extended periods of time is impaired if not actually degraded to
a dangerous level. The personnel make the ship go and in their enthusiasm
be the cause of its not being able to do the job it was built to do*
The Organisation
The third and final segment of the problem of proper inventory
management is the organization of the Navy in regard to inventory manage*
ment of shipboard material* Shipboard support is the most regulated,
documentized and scrutinised area in the ship. The ship is inundated with
directives from the Secretary of Defense,^The Secretary of the Navy, The
Chief of Naval Operations, Ilia Fleet Commander, The Type Commander, The
Squadron Commander and The Division Casnander. In addition manuals, direc-
tives and letters of instruction flow from the Bureau of Ships, the Bureau
of Supplies and Accounts, the Bureau of Weapons, the Bureau of Yards and
Docks, the Defense Supply Agency and their inventory control points. The
Navy Supply System issues procedural directives from the Navy Supply Cent
^See Appendix A, Exhibit 1 for Organization Clici
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the Ships Parts Control Center, the Electronic Supply Office and the Mobile
Logistic Support Units. Many of these directives are uncoordinated , and
even acre are contradictory.
The organisation of the Navy affects not only the Supply Department
of a ship. It is omnipresent in all functions. It involves the Supply
Department in a voluminous paper barrage. The flow of information and
policy pertaining to shipboard inventory management is not merely redundant
and confusing, but is also self-eliminating. A point of diminishing re-
turns is readied when the recipients of these directives have achieved
their saturation point. It is difficult enough to manage a shipboard in-
ventory on a day-to-day basis without having to consider the consequences
of a management decision in light of many contradictory directives. The
simple act of requisitioning material can be a frightening exercise. The
material has a Federal Stock Number and a code describing what segment of
the overall Federal Supply System has cognisance of the material. The
Supply Department receives reams of Federal Stock Number changes monthly.
These tell the ship Supply Officer that an item that was under the Navy's
Electronic Supply Office is now under the Defense Electronic Supply Center.
If the Supply Officer does not inscribe his requisition with the current
code and Federal Stock Number he may slow the eventual receipt of the
needed material by months, or in extreme cases, the requisition will be
lost in a computer. If the Supply Department in a ship kept all the
changes in this one area current, that is kept strict account of the
stock number migrations, it would have time for little else.
The Fleet and Type Commanders are responsible for ensuring that

•a ship will have the material endurance in term3 of days Co be self-
sustaining under combat conditions. The Fl . fttseribel chase endurance
levels in an operational directive and the various Type Coraaanders have
the prerogative of increasing these levels in their own directives . In
many instances, converting a quantity ?f repair parts rtqttirvd by an allow-
ance list prepared by the Bureau of Ships into day3 of endurance has been
and is still an impossibility . Endurance levels hsve been standardised by
tiie Chief of Naval Operations sod the impact of this will be discussed in
Chapter III.
The effect of conflicting directives and policies on the operation
of the Supply Department of a ship could well be i r in itself. This
has been and shall be an important segment contributing to the problem of
optimising inventory management of shipboard material
,
The parameters of fcha problem of optimizing inventory management
of shipboard material have been discussed as a three-segment problem.
The Ship . The construction of both pre-Rorean vintage ships and post-
Korean vintage ships, although for different reasons, resulted in Navy
ships with installed machinery and equipment that were peculiar. This
individuality in pre-Korean ships was due to the need for machinery at the
moment, without regard to the source. Mass production methods employed in
construe cior. of these ships did not take into account the problems of
future material support for these varied installed equipments. Allowance
lists were ignored or abused so that by the end of World War II the state
.
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of material support based on shipboard allowances was In chaos. The post-
Korean vintage ships are constructed on a unit method in different shipyards
throughout the country. Competitive pricing is the policy used to procure
bids for installed equipments and machinery. The low bidder receives the
contract and since the equipments are built to performance standards there
is peculiarity in-built by variances in construction as well as taanufacture
.
This poses a difficult support problem in terms of standardization and
technical training for members of a ship's crew.
The Personnel . The individuals that comprise a ship's crew soon become
a working team. In their individual enthusiasm and ingenuity they build
within a ship an informal supply system that is pyramided at every level
and in every department. This informal supply system stockpiles material
but does not necessarily requisition the material from the formal supply
system. The use of the barter system to support the informal supply system
causes a breakdown when the source of supply in the informal system is not
available. Requirements have not been recorded in the formal system and
support is not available when the user finally goes to the formal system
for material.
The Organisation . The complex organisation of the Department of Defense
and in turn the Navy increases the task of the shipboard Supply Department
in performing its duty. The volume of conflicting and uncoordinated direc-
tives do nothing to aid the Supply Officer solve his problems. This segment
is probably the most serious and complex.

CHAPTER II
MAJOR PROGRAMS PRIOR TO AUGUST, 1964
Coordinated Shipboard allowance List (COSAL)
The conclusion of Uorld War II found Navy ships in a disorganised
state insofar as inventory management of shipboard material was concerned.
The allowance lists had not been maintained and updated, and additional
equipments had been added without the benefit of any acknowledgement by
the ship. This in turn was not reported to the Bureau of Ships, and there-
fore there was no system wide support for these e juipments . The allowance
lists found in our ships at this period in time were of three basic types.
The first was a Revised Master Allowance List, including all types of
material under the cognizance of the Bureau of Ships, that was approved
for installation on all the ships in the fleet. The second type was the
Type Allowance List. This included the material installed on certain
ships of a type, i.e., destroyer, cruiser, battleship, or a class within
a type, i.e., destroyers built to one set of specifications and plans.
The Type Allowance List was the basis for the preparation of the Individual
Allowance List, the third type. This third type was the allowance list
prepared for an individual ship. These three types applied only to Bureau
of Ships items. There wore actually four different allowance lists of
which the three types were only two. The Bureau of Ships, The Bureau of




control of shipboard allowances for items tinder their jurisdiction. Each
category of material under a technical bureau was under the management
control of an inventory manager. The inventory manager was under the
technical control of a technical bureau, but in reality, under the manage-
ment control of the Bureau of Supplies and Accounts. The following break-





















The allowance lists were prepared in different formats based on the
differing philosophies of the technical bureaus. The technical bureau
would design, procure, install and provide for initial equipment support
of on item and prepare a recommended allowance list for the equipment.
This list was then forwarded to a naval shipyard which was assigned the
responsibility of preparing an individual allowance list for equipments
designated as its responsibility. These shipyards were known as allowance
list preparing activities. The formats used by individual preparing
activities were not standardized. The inventory manager was responsible
for planning, stocking and distributing material required to support
equipments in the shipboard allowance lists. Identification of what
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deparuaents managed what material was made by an alphabetical cognizance
symbol. The following are examples:
Components (Complete Equipments)
Cognisance Symbol Responsible Activity
S Cog BUSHIPS, Hull, Machinery & Electrical
F Cog BUSHIPS, Electrouics
Parta for Coapoaanta
11 Cog Ships Parts Control Center
N Cog Electronic Supply Office
These cog symbols prefixed the stock number of the equipment or the repair
part in the allowance list. James V. 0* Conner3, and J. E. Hamilton^ go into
great detail on this particular subject. The array of allowance lists
alone were a challenge to the stamina and ingenuity of the ship's crew in
identifying a needed repair part so that it could be ordered. The individual
allowance lists required the user to possess a depth of knowledge of the ship
in regard to its equipments that many could not possibly attain. Therefore
if a required part could not be properly identified the ship would inscribe
complete component identification on the requisition. This included the
group, page and line number from the allowance list, the name plate data
from the disabled equipment and all other identifying information. The
1LCdr. J. V. O'Conner, SC, USN, The Effect of the Coordinated chip-
board Allowance List Over the Revised Individual Allowance List . Profes-
sional Paper on Supply Management, September 29, 1958. (Unpublished)
2
Hamilton, op. cit .« p. 6.

ushore supply activity would then have to research the requisition to pro*
dace tlie complete Standard Navy Stock Number and cognizance symbol before
supplying action could be taken.
The shipboard allowance lists o£ tills era were prepared and main*
tained annually. The upkeep, when data was properly supplied by the ships,
was an enormous operation requiring hundreds of clerks. This system might
still be in use today if it were not for the fact that the rapid growth
of the Federal Agencies during World War XI spurred a move to centralize
procurement for all of the Federal Government. The first step in this
centralisation was to assign a Federal Stock Number (FSN) to all materials
and equipments used within the Federal Government. The effect of this move
on the allowance list system used aboard Navy ships was significant. It
was estimated that a one time conversion of Standard Navy Stock Numbers to
Federal Stock Numbers in shipboard allowance lists would require a minimum
of 20,000 man years.- This estimate was based on a manual conversion and
did not include the changes that would be accumulating while the initial
conversion was in process. It was obvious that the conversion would have
to be made with the aid of automatic data processing equipment.
Concurrently with the advent of the FSN conversion the Bureau of
Ships was developing a new type of shipboard allowance list. This new
allowance list was to be a comprehensive listing of all equipments installed
in a ship regardless of which bureau or inventory manager had cognisance.
The new allowance list, which would be coordinated among the bureaus so
^Brought out in an interview with Mr. J. Gumenick, Head of the




Chat the format would be uniform and included in one list under one index,
was named Coordinated Shipboard Allowance Lis;: (C03AL)
.
Tlie requirement to convert all Navy stock numbers to F3N and the
!cnowledge that machine processing was required gave impetus to the prop-
osition of redesigning the allowance lists at the same time the stock
number conversion x/as being processed. The AD? machinery could do both
jobs at the same time, and one giant step forward in shipboard management
of material could be attained. The CGSAL con .3 accepted by all
echelons involved end implementation commenced.
The vital step in preparing the new CQSAL's wa3 delegated to the
crew of a ship. They tstructed to review their individual allowance
lists and validate that an item listed as an installed equipment on the
allowance list was in fact tlie same equipment installed in the ship. The
validation of an allowance list on the ship re suires a wail to wall in-
ventory of tlie installed equipment. Each and every piece of ejuipoent
must be physically inventoried and checked as to manufacturer, model and
type to insure that the allowance list accurately describes it and itc
repair support. If this is not done conscientiously, the repair support
for equipment no longer installed will remain aboard a ship and serve only
as ballast. Many ships conducted the validation fully realising its
importance and many did not. The validated allowance lists were then sent
to the technical bureau having cognizance and thence were forwarded to the
Bureau of Ships and converted into CORAL' s.
The COSAL format is designed for the shipboard user so that needed
material can be quickly identified in more than one way. It is a simple
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aocuaent broken down into three basic partg . Part I is the index, a series
of cross reference listings. To describe the listings it is necessary to
understand socks of the terminology used, h component as used in COSAL
language is an entire equipment such as a radar or a part of an entire
equipment that in itself is supported by one or mora Allowance Part Lists.
An Allowance Part List is a listing of repair parts allowed and t
quantities of each rn juired to support a component. A Component Identifica-
tion timber is the number used to tie the Allowance Part List to the com-
ponent. A Service Application Number ties a component to a larger equip-
ment. The COSAL index, then, is constructed of three separate listings.
The first is a summary listing of Allowance Part Lists (APL'o) included in
the COSAL in numerical sequence of Component Identification Numbers (CID's).
The second is a listing of components supported by the COSAL in nomenclature
alphabetical sequence referencing applicable CID numbers which identify the
supporting APLa. The third part is a listing of components supported by
the COSAL in Service Application Number sequence referencing applicable
CID numbers.
Part II of the COSAL is a numerical order assemblage by CID number
of all the APL's providing support in the particular ship. Each APL con-
sists of a written description of the applicable component characteristics
and identifying data. There i3 also a repair parts listing with the fol-
lowing data included: FSN or Manufacturer's Part Sfomber, population of
the installed component being supported by this APL, unit of issue, quantity
allowed based oa allowance selection tables.
Part III is a Stock Number Sequence Listing of all material in the
.
COSAL. This list is in ae uance and also provides the item name, the ap-
plicable CID's, notes, xm.it of issue ami the allowed iuaatiey.
Ibis COSAL is an improvement over the old allowance list because
it facilitates the identification of required material. Toe user does not
need a stock number to identify a needed part and can quickly ascertain if
a required item is allowed. The fact thai: the CQ3AL is convenient, in-
clusive and up-to-date does not guarantee that the allowed material is in
fact on board 3hip. The COSAL was the first saajor program in the overall
galaxy of programs that were instituted by the SJavy in order to improve the
inventory management of shipboard material and thus optimize the ship's
capability to be self-sufficient over long periods of time away from sources
of supply. In itself the COSAL could not accomplish the goal and it was
not intended to do so. The continuing migration and change of FSH's and
the continuous change and addition of installed equipment in a ship soon
made the COSAL obsolete before the latest editions were off the press. It
was generally agreed that a ship could not keep up with rapid and multi-
tudinous changes that would affect its COSAL, It was further agreed that
a continuing program was needed to accomplish this adjustment, which was
the next major program invoiced by the Navy.
The Supply Operations Assistance grosraa (SOAP)
The accuracy of the first COSAL was predicated on the validity of
the ship's individual allowance list. Similarly, the validity of a ship's
second COSAL was based on the validity of the first. The arrival of the
COSAL did not eliminate the problems associated with continuous updating of
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this document. There were many instances when ships could not apply the
current FSN's to their requisitions for laaterial. This caused the requisi-
tions to be rejected by the supply system, and if not rejected they were
slowed or lost. There had to be a method applied to this continuing problem
to arrive at a satisfactory solution.
In the past, the operational commitments of Navy ships did not
allow a period of time long enough to accomplish an allowance validation
during normal deployments and training evolutions. The one period of time
that a ship was not committed to fleet oriented missions was when it entered
a shipyard for its regular overhaul. The regular overhaul occurred every
24-30 months depending on schedules, available funds, and shipyard workload.
It was believed that since the regular overhaul was conducted for at least
two months that this would be the only time available in the shipboard
operating cycle to properly accomplish an up-date and purification of ship-
board support material. In 1959 the Supply Operations Assistance Program
(SOAP) was implemented to do this.**
The SOAP was originated and managed by the Bureau of Supplies and
Accounts. The scheduling and overall supervision was the responsibility
of the Commanders of the Atlantic and Pacific Fleets. The Type Commanders
were the actual supervisors, since they held the funds for their respective
ships for the purchase of deficiencies uncovered. SOAP was soon described
as a supply availability or supply overhaul since it was conducted during
*U. S. Navy, Bureau of Supplies and Accounts, Instruction 4441.12





a ship '8 regular maintenance overhaul in a shipyard.
Under the organisation of this new system, a SOAP team was assigned
to naval shipyards. The SOAP team consisted of an officer of the Supply
Corps and a number of experienced senior chief storekeepers, as veil as
senior storekeepers who were assigned as representatives of each Type
Commander. The Typs Commander representatives insured that ships of their
type complied with specific SOAP policies as promulgated by respective
Type Commanders. Specialists from the shipyard were assigned or available
to the Sti&P team to aid in aspects of technical supply requiring material
identification. There are many parts in a ship that are improperly
numbered or have no identification. The expertise essential in identifica-
tion of parts is a vital element in the supply overhaul. The SOAP team had
assigned to them large areas of warehouse for material stowage and proces-
sing. They also had computer time available to run listings picturing the
finished product. The listings will be investigated in detail as the SOAP
process is explored.
The SOAP program was designed so that when a ship entered the
shipyard for its regular maintenance overhaul, all repair parts in store-
rooms of the ship's formal supply systeu would physically be offloaded and
placed in the SOAP team warehouse. With the aid of assigned members of
the ship's crew the entire load would be counted , identified and preserved
as needed by the SOAP team personnel. Upon completion of the inventory the
material would be checked against the COSAL to determine the excesses and
deficiencies. The criteria imposed on this determination was usage and
the quantity allowed in the COSAL. The first ships to complete the SOAP
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often found themselves in embarassiug straits when within days after
completing their overhaul they would be in dire need of u part that had
been off"loaded as an excess. There was a hue and cry from many quarters
that this SOAP program woulu be che end ..pboard material readiness.
The program was in jeopardy of termination after only a six months' oper-
ating history.
1o comprehend fully the reason for this unfavorable reaction, it
is necessary to try to understand the events prior to a ship's overhaul.
The ship has just received the letter of instruction from the Type Com-
mander explaining the SOAP program and the ship's part in it. The Com-
Banding Officer reads the letter and inciediately calls for the Supply
Officer. He shows the letter to the Supply Officer and tells him that
this will be his project, lie informs the Supply Officer that the ship can
only spare Supply Department personnel to go ashore and inspect these
repair parts. The other departments need all their people for the main-
tenance overhaul. The repair parts are Supply's responsibility and the
program itself is disruptive to the normal overhaul routine. The Supply
Officer therefore shall take complete charge and not involve anyone else
in this "Supply Evolution
The letter of instruction also requires that the ship conduct an
i :uipment validation of the COSAL. This must be completed 60 days prior to
entering the overhaul yard to ensure completion of the revised COSAL upon
completion of the overhaul. The Supply Officer know® that his people, the
storekeepers, coxnaissaryiaan, ship's servicemen, cannot validate the equip-
ments installed since they could not identify them if they did locate them.
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A Navy ship is a maze of primary and mat y systems with equipments and
components buried in every nook and cranny of the hull, The physical
inventory and validation can only be done properly as a shipboard effort
comprising all the expertise of individu ' sroup specialties. The
captain insists that this is Supply's bailiwick and he can ask the other
department heads for assistance on the validation on a non-interference
basis.
The validation is conducted by each department on a non-interfer-
ence basis which actually results in a spot check of respective department
equipment against the COSAL and acknowledgement by the department head
concerned.
When the ship arrives in the shipyard, the repair parts are off-
loaded as rapidly and haphazardly as possible on a non-interference basis.
The Supply Department personnel are the only members of the shipboard team
that process the material under the guidaiice of the SOAP team. Often a
part being processed is found to be a not-allowed item. The SGAP team
personnel inquire ox the ship's personnel as to its ioport^uce in the ship.
The par*, may have been ©ratted from the allowance list in error and actually
is a critical repair part in support oi aa essential aompoaent or equipment.
It had no usage but is aboard as an insurance, item. The storekeeper on
the ship's teaaa has no idea what its runctiou is and since it is not-allowed
and indicates no demand he g that it should be of ..id ac Ml
excess repair part, if this deci tking prcc iiundred-
£old, it is clear that the results will cause a hue aud cry against the S0&?
program. The ship no . COSAL that does not reflect installed equipment
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and does not provide for proper support of the c uipoent actually in-
stalled.
Situations like the above ware often the results of shipboard at-
titudes, and the Type Commanders were aware of this. They knew that SOAP
would be the answer to many of the problems faced by their ships in main*
tainlng an optimal shipboard load of support material to make them self*
sufficient over extended deployments. As a result, they instituted an
educational program to teach the officers and men in their ships that the
benefits of a proper supply overhaul were ahipwide and not Just for the
improvement of the Supply Department. They directed that a Commanding
Officer make every effort to ensure that his ship was combat ready in all
respects including material readiness . The SOAP program would benefit and
Improve shipboard material readiness and therefore oust receive the Com-
manding Officer's personal attention. The SOAP program became an all hands
evolution as a result of this educational program and has grown to be an
important phase in improving inventory management of shipboard material.
The awareness by Command of the importance of reliable shipboard
material support has led to the environment that surrounds the SOAP program
today. The Captain now calls a meeting of all department heads and ex-
plains to them the importance of an accurate, thorough, hull-to-hull
inventory of installed equipments. He directs that validation teams be
organised consisting of members of all departments. A compartment*by-
compartment validation schedule is instituted and complied with. Equip-
ments and components are visually sighted and tagged to acknowledge in3pc -
tion. If there are any variances between naraeplate data and those described

35
in the COSAL the changes are noted in the validation team's working copy
of the COSAL. Ttie validation is now couplete and accurate and the revised
COSAL will reflect the material needs of the ship.
The Supply Officer is nominally in charge of the program but he
receives Cull support from the Commanding Officer. The haphazard off-load
of material no longer occurs* One month prior to the overhaul the Officer-
ia»Charge of the cognisant SOAP team boards the ship and in company with
the Supply Officer inspects the storerooms. He takes an estimate of the
amount and physical deterioration of the storeroom stock. The results of
this inspection are used as a basis for his personnel requirements that
the ship must fill as part of the supply overhaul. The Officer-iu-Charge
of the SOAP team then holds a meeting tilth the ship's Commanding Officer
and explains the details of the personnel requirements and the off-load
plans. In addition, the ship's Supply Officer is requested to make schematic
drawings of all his storerooms so that the SOAP team can recreate them as
a mock-up la tlieir warehouse space. The bins and drawers containing the
support material are numbered and identified so that the entire bin or
drawer's contents is off-loaded as a unit &ad placed in the SOAP mock-up.
There is no more time lost in sifting through piles of parts. This procedure
is mi efi-. improved method of physical inventory.
The ship's team li cc ..jbers of evary department that
are qualified iu their specialty and also have ac 4uired knowledge of the
ship's needs. If the part referred to earlier is not on the allowance list
end has no usage history the decision to keep or off-ioad is now made by an
expert. There are far less embarrassments to the ship due to an off-load
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in ignorance. The hue and cry against SOAP has changed to a
for extensions of the program.
In addition to the benefit to the ship in the form of accurate
inventories and allowance lists, the benefits of the data accumulated as
the result of th. ' are passed along to Type Commanders and the higher
echelons. The most important is a comprehensive listing of allowance
list deficiencies. This listing includes the stocl; number, the nomen-
clature, the allowed quantity, the quantity inventoried, the iuantity
deficient, the unit cost and the total cost for funding the item. Costs
are subtotaled by application, i.e., Hull, Jiachinery and Electrical, or
in any mtanner the Type (kraaander might desire. Total cost is also in-
dicated. The Type Commanders differ as to their policy in funding SOAP
deficiencies prior to the ship's overhaul completion and the ship is
forced to go to MM tilth a list and no material. Others have seen fit to
fund all deficiencies. Maoy have typically funded deficiencies in range
only. Range In this sense is buying one repair part when three are allowed
and three are deficient. Tbe by products of the use of SOAP also include
a frequency of demand listing which reconstructs the number of issues for
each item over the period between SG&P's, This was not available in the
first generation SOAP due to the sparsity and accuracy of usage data but
it is now used in establishing inventory oiaaessaent policy at a shipboard
and system level.
The SOAP program is often viewed as a crutch that tends to reduce
awareness of day-to-day shipboard material mana,^emant by responsible
personnel. The argument continues that one or two SOAP' 3 should be
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Eldest and then tlie ship* a Supply Department should be retrod to
maintain I art level acquired. The majority opinion in the
Ilavy is that SOAP may be a crutch, but it is a necessary and beneficial
program. The majority lias ensured the continuation and extension of this
worthwhile program. The extension will be discussed in Chapter IV, The
improvement in ship reliability in terms of increased dependability of
shipboard material support can be attributed, it: , to the continued
and increased Command interest in this area brou^h.-. abou;: by the SOAP
program.
litary Saseatialitv Codiny. CICC)
The techniiues developed during World War II in applying statis-
tically developed iUantitative values to strategy and tactics in \rtiat is
known cs QMMB tlmmf stimulated similar techniques in all areas of problem
WJMag* Hie overall field involving techni ;ucs is known as Opera-
Lions Research, derations Research attempts to solve a problem by
assigning tuanti.i;stive weight to the various factors that must be taken
into account in solving the problem ami the relationships of these factors
to one another. Once these factors are jaantified they are then expressed
in mathematical la a 4nation form. The series of interrelated
eauations is called a model. The model can be constructed to maximise gain
(profit) or adaimize 1 applied to v ution of the problem.
Newman and Summer lis ^aracteri. LSuttioai in
which Operations Research is valuable:
1. A pre .implicated or involves such a sheer mass
of data that it cannot be fully grasped by one single person's
•
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mind, and yet its parts are so interrelated that dividing it into
comprehensible units would not necessarily yield the best answer.
2. The relationships are known, clear-cut, and of a type that
can be expressed by available mathematical formulae
.
3. Statistical data are available for all important variables .5
The characteristics inherent ?*.n business problems lend themselves to
solution through the techniques of Operations Research. The one business
problem that is ideally suited to solution using this technique is inven-
tory management
.
The basic problem of inventory management is having the right
amount of stock on liand — neither too much nor too little. Fundamentally,
inventory control is deciding how much to buy and when. The basic problem
in shipboard inventory management is to construct an allowance list that
will provide support for installed equipments over an extended period of
time within space and budgetary constraints. The simplest model used in
solving inventory management problems is the Economic Order Quantity (EOQ).
It is expressed algebraically as:
Q equals C times the square root of Y
Where C is the cost factor and Y is the
yearly demand in dollars
This basic formula does not take into consideration such factors as ware-
house space, quantity discounts and transportation costs. Variations of
this basic formula are used to include these variables* The basic premise
of EOQ is that demand is predictable if it is based on usage data. Where
—
^William H. Newman and Charles E. Summer 3 Jr., The Process of





demand criteria are not available the problem is normally solved by the
application of judgement based on past experience. This is the basis for
the majority of items on the shipboard COSAL. What if the judgement applied
is in error? The price of bad judgement in allowance list construction
could mean the total degradation of a ship in accomplishing its assigned
mission. The EOQ model is not capable of solving this problem by itself
so other means must be considered.
The fact of the matter is that we cannot predict the demand
with certainty. We must, therefore, decide upon an objective
which we will attempt to achieve. For items of a critical nature
the objective might well be never to run out of thess items.
6
A ship must run out of the critical items. What are the critical items?
Who must decide on what is critical or non-critical? Should it be a
technical bureau or the ship? The answer is intuitively obvious. Hie
critical nature of an equipment and its support can only be decided by
the shipboard personnel who live with and are surrounded by the equip-
ments 24 hours every day. The COSAL and all its format refinements did
not reflect the critical value of allowance items. There was no weight
assigned to s repair part that would establish its military worth or
essentiality in ion to all other items in the allowance list. If a
weight could be assigned to each equtpmant, component and supporting
repair parts it would undoubtedly abet £3 liaising of shipboard inven-
tories to sustain material readiness. the assigned worth or essentiality
could serve the dual purpose of stocking and expediting tribes the part was
5
Mina Haskind Gouray, A Non-Mathematical Discussion of the Allow-
ance I«i3t Problem , The George Washington University Logistics Research




Oiio of the first formal studies in the area of military worth was
begun by the Navy in 1958 with the following objective:
Tiie approach (of this study) is based upon a consideration of
two interdependent factors as influencing the seriousness of part
shortages. One of these is MISSION EFFECT which measures the
effect of component failures on the ship's ability to execute its
assigned mission. The other, MAINTENANCE POTENTIAL, has to do
with the effect of end item or part failures on the operability
of the parent component. Where such failures would render the
parent component inoperable, MAINTENANCE POTENTIAL considers the
capability of the ship's force, in the event of a part shortage,
to maintain the component t tis factory operable condition
through oil-board manufacture of the required part, and/or can-
nibal isation, and/or the employment of jury-rigging procedures.
Part shortages are relatively more serious when, in the event of
such a shortage, on-board manufacture, canniDaliuation, and jury-
rigging are not feasible.
7
Mission Effect and Maintenance Potential were the two elements used in
this initial study to determine the military worth of repair parts. The
aathodology used was as follows:
Military worth questionnaires for each of these elements were
developed bg . la concern I
the use of worth evaluations in the allowance list area, a deci-
sion was made to obtain worth estimates for the component
and installed part range of a single combatant ship. The fleet
submarine, USS TIHU (S3416), was chosen for this purpose. Ap-
proximately 1,300 components were evaluated. These include the
tour Lf&eatiansi Mechat ^.kj Electri-
cal; Electronics; Ordnance; Equipage and Portable. Evaluations
were aioo obtained for part applications
of various cognisances for these same components. Components were
evaluated bj . t'arts were evaluated
by enlisted submarine personnel, and by civilian technicians of
participating Sup] wmad Control .. Tin. at
evaluations were obtained for each component. Two independent
aluations were obtaiiied for the parts.
'Henry Solomon, Joseph P. Fennel 1 and Marvin Denicoff, AJ
For Determiu . Military Uoytu c. ^are Tarta r, The George Washington
University Logistics : ~ Project, Serial T-S2/5S, April, 1958, p. ii.

The juestionnaire included a statement of a typical wartime
patrol for a submarine of the TIRU class . The most significant
aspect of the mission statement Has a requirement that the sub-
marine stay on station independent of supply support for a period
of sixty days . Sixty days was recocunnded by submariners M the
limit of a wartime patrol for a fleet type boat, the outside limit
established in consideration of the 1 r>r the endurance
of the vessel by food, fuel, ammunition, and personnel morale.
The mission requirement of sixty days of independent operation, in
itself, provides a measurement of the seriousness of part shortages.
Shortages are more or less serious depending on the capability of
tlic ship to stay on station sixty days without repair. Here simply
put, if the ship can perform effectively for sixty days without
the part, then the shortage of such a part is not particularly
rious, and the military worth of the part is relatively low.
It is important that the answers provided not be taken out
of context. Tiiere was no intention, in the answers given to the
questionnaires, that the data be used to draw conclusions on the
value of having any Individual component aboard the submarine.
The study, therefore, carries no implication of evidence on the
total number of components which a submarine should have. For
example, the motion picture projector was placed in the lowest
Mission Effect category, but by no means supports the conclusion
that submarines should not have projeceors . The purpose of the
study was to develop a military worth measure for use in allowance
list area. Its goal, initially, is to improve the Navy's capability
for providing allowance lists which maximise the endurance of
vessels in consideration of space and budgetary limitations.
The two important conclusions reached by the study were that first, there
was a high amount of agreement (92.4%) among the independent answers
responding to the questionnaires ; and second, that the components classi-
fied in the highest worth category were 29.5% in the Mechanical and
Electrical component classification, 0% in Electronics, 29% in the Ordnance
classification and 0% in the Equipage and Portable classification.^ The
study group concluded that the juestionnaire methodology could be success-
fully applied in solving questions of military worth of shipboard components
8Ibid .» pp. ii-iii. 9Ibid ., p. 52.

and repair parts. Shipboard allowar.ce lists would be improved by in-
cluding military worth decisions in allowance list construction and even
wider applications of kbiM d^cLji^as co^lc be nade L- of
pvocuffaaaat aad die .. . > . provisi teroi ition
atocs. levels, disposal decisions and In the preparation of critical item
lists.
If military worth was assigned to each allowance list component
and repair part, then a model could be constructed by operations research
oriented personnel . This model could exclude the frequency of demand
variable required in an 20Q model and could be constructed to include such
variables as the number of parts to be stocked, the relative weight of each
item (Military Worth), all subject to the constraints of space and funding.
Wlten this concept was first announced, enthusiasm for it ran high in the
Navy.
The interest in military worth was translated to implementation
in allowance list construction of the Polaris equipped Fleet Ballistic
Submarines, (3SBN) . The vital nature of mission accomplishment required
of these submarines could not be jeopardized by any deficiency in on-board
repair parts. The allowance lists for these submarines required them to
provide dependable support without question. The decision was made to
construct SSBN allowance lists assigning military worth weights to the
installed equipments, components and repair parts. The techniques utilized
for accomplishing this task were developed by The George Washington Uni-
-
.rsity Logistics Research Project under contract to the Office of Naval

Research. 10 The relative military worth of an item was depicted by an
assigned numerical code. This code was named the Military Essentiality
Code (MEC) and was assigned on the basis of a multi-weighted evaluation.
To simplify the coding essentiality decisions were required in three areas:
His3ion or Equipment Effect, Redundancy and Alternatives, Within each of
these basic areas a numerical weight was assigned to measure the degree of
effect on a mission due to an equipment failure. Did the equipment failure
cause total, partial or complete degradation of the mission- These three
segments of Mission Effect were assigned a numerical weight. Similarly, a
component failure was measured in terms of total, partial or complete
degradation of an equipment with numerical weight assigned to each segment.
In the second basic area Redundancy was weighted numerically according to
the number of similar equipments installed in the shin. The third basic
area of Alternatives was weighted. The nature of the degree of degradation
was measured within each basic area as follows:
A, Mission Effect: Total Degradation (2)
(IF ALL FAIL) Partial Degradation (1)
Minimal Degradation (0)
B. Redundancy: No Redundancy (2)
(IF ONE FAILS) Reduced Effectiveness (1)
C. Alternatives: No Alternatives (2)
(IF ONE FAILS) Reduced Effectiveness (1)
Equivalent Effectiveness (0)
Equivalent Effectiveness (0)11
^Marvin Denicoff , et. ul . Toe Polaris Military Essentiality
System. The George Washington University Logistics Research Project,




In the event of an equipment failure the :iilitary Essentiality Code of
U*e equipment was based on the combination of the effect on the r»hi
mission as the above wei- tdicata, ination of (2), (2), (2)
would place toe e t in the hi lity coda, Xn the
Polaris allowance list coding this additional factor una introduced and
weighted accordingly. iatioo was measured in terms
HftfflTn tttod pinpoi Ltlaj Uws nature or type . ^. adation, i.^ .,
Accuracy, Reliability and 2fficieii . MR codes numbered li©.1^
. of this program was proved when the SSBH*s commenced
Chair long patrols. Allowance list supper It on the ffiC concur
proved far e: to the number \ *^acia3
arising during the long deployment. E^ipaant and component failure due
to lack of oa-fcoar ;-r parte was far lower than in any other ship
type In the Havy. 4s a result, it was fait that this improved salf-
sufficiency should then be accomplished by all the fleet.
The MEC pre la the entire fleet was implemented by the Chief
of Steve! Operatioxxs. It was to be a co-iv:-your .self operation* with all
steps from the coding to decision making to be made at the shipboard
level. In tine SSBN allc list coding aany of the essentiality deci-




ever, Co accomplish flee C with or technical
Stance . Tim philosophy for this program vat jr^any




in the Navy. The implementing instruction set with resistance and mis-
givings throughout tlio float. Those will bo discussed in detail in
Chapter IV. Nevertheless, an order is an order and it was carried out.
It fell to the Typo Commander actually to implement the MEC program in
his respective ships. The basic guidelines laid down by the Chief of
Naval Operations were not clear cut. The system of coding was similar
to the Polaris program but greatly simplified. The three basic areas
were the same with a change in numerical weights:
A. Mission Effect Total Degradation (3)
(IP ALL FAIL) Partial Degradation (2)
Minimal Degradation (1)
8. Redundancy No Redundancy (3)
(IF ONE FAILS) Reduced Effectiveness (2)
uivalent Effectiveness (1)
C. Alternatives No Alternatives (3)
(IF ONE FAILS) Reduced Effectiveness (2)
Equivalent Effectiveness (1)
The combination of (3), (3), (3) would produce a MEC of 1. There were
only 27 MEC codes in this program. Additionally, components would be
assigned the sane code as the equipment they supported. In the Polaris
program components had been evaluated individually. The judgements re-
quired now were greatly reduced from those required in the Polaris pro-
gram.
The implementing directive required that a test of this coding
procedure be conducted and that the results of the test would be evaluated
prior to fleet-wide coding. The Type commanders under guidance from the
Fleet commanders conducted test coding of selected ships. Prior to actual
commencement of coding in the selected ships an intensive procedure and
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policy conference was required. The ships selected were normally of the
same type built to the saaa plans and specifications. The ship's company
was required to mahe the judgements and assign the coding. These personnel
had to be informed of the purpose and benefits of the NX to their ship.
They had to be convinced of these benefits before procedures could be
agreed upon. There was a great deal of conflict as to definition. An
example was the feeling of ship's company that the basic area of alterna-
tives could include jury-rigging or ingenuity. The Type Commander's
representatives were required to define alternatives. In most cases jury-
rigging was not an acceptable alternative within the MEC program. There
were countless policy decisions of this nature rehired prior to coramence-
ment. The physical attack on the problem had to be outlined. Equipments
listed in the COSAL had to be aligned with actual ship's plans to ensure
that entire systems were included in the coding. These conferences usually
required two full days before the ships could commence the coding.
The MEC program was classified top priority in terras of time al-
lowed for accomplishment. The test ships still rehired in-excess of
sixty days to complete the coding. The results of the coding of two
ships of the same type in one Type Command" indicated MEC agreement in
only 24 per cent of the equipments. Similar or less correlation between
test ships was discovered in other Type Commands, The MEC program, as such,
never became implemented on a fleet-wide basis.
The failure of this attempt at fleet-wide HSC of ship's COSAL




led to one less publicized attempt to apply this tachnijue to shipboard
allowance lists. Tha shipboard level coding had been unsuccessful, so
why not attempt to code allowance lists with the aid of an independent
contractor? The philosophy behind the new coding was changed from the
previous IEC attempt. Instead of treating a single equipment as an
independent unit it was deemed mare realistic by the contractor to
consider the equipment in combination with other equipments, and mission
accomplishment as dependent upon the interrelation of these combinations.
In effect a ship's mission was related to system performance. / destroyer,
for example, may have three or four primary missions and its readiness
should be related to the capability of performing these missions. As an
e:;aaplG, it can be assumed that a destroyer is assigned tha primary mission
to perform the Anti-submarine Warfare (ASW) underwater target mission. It
can also be assumed that this primary mission is related to five systems
as follows:
^ Mobility




Formally stated, readiness to perform the ASW mission is dependent upon
(is a function of) the performance of the systems:
EASW s F (Si, S2 , S3, S4, S5)l*
14Cdr. H. F. Mills, SC, USH, "Military Essentiality," Newsletter ,
Magazine of the U. S. Kavy Supply Corps, XXVI, No. 3, March 1963, p. *
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If this functional relationship Is translated into plain language it
means that the commanding officer of a ship must be concerned about the
state of readiness of all the shipboard systems considered together.
This philosophy of system combinations in support of readiness was trans-
lated into indices that portrayed the degradation of a ship's system in
terms of mission degradation. This program was named Military Essentiality
Through Readiness Indices (METRI). A few test ships were analysed by the
contractor and indices constructed for them. Fleet-wide accomplishment
lias not occurred and although future implementation is not Impossible it
is highly improbable.
The major programs implemented by the Navy in an effort to improve
Inventory Management of Shipboard Material prior to August 1964 have been
discussed as follows:
Coordinated Shipboard Allowance Li3t (COSAL) » The state of shipboard
allowance lists at the end of World War II was one of confusion and dis-
regard. Tha up-keep during the war had caused the allowance lists to
become out-dated and inaccurate. The ship's allowance list did not
reflect proper support for installed shipboard equipments. In addition
the four different allowance lists, i.e., Machinery and Electrical,
Electronics, Ordnance and Aviation, were prepared by different Toclinical
Bureaus using varied formats and philosophies. Allowance list items were




The Bureau of Ships lied been developing a new allowance list that
would be prepared in the 3ama format and include the allowance list
re iuircacnts of all Technical Bureaus . The advent of the Federal Stock
Number gave impetus to the iiaplementation of the new allowance list due
to the required changes raado necessary by conversion to FSN. A concurrent
prograra translated the Standard Navy Stock Number to a FSN and also pro-
duced the first shipboard allowance list in the new coordinated format.
This new allowance list was designated the Coordinated Shipboard Allowance
List (COSAL) and included the allowance lists of all the Technical Bureaus
in the same format. The COSAL consisted of three parts: Part X was
divided into three indices by allowance parts list component identifica-
tion numbers, an alphabetical listing by nomenclature and sequential
listing of service applications. Part II is a sequential listing by
component identification number. Part III is a stock number sequence
listing. The COSAL facilitated identification and control of shipboard
inventories
.
Tfee Supply Prorations Assistance Program (SOAP) . This program was in-
stituted to assure accuracy of COSAL support. It load long been realized
that allowance lists in general and the COSAL in particular were not kept
current and therefore did not reflect proper support for shipboard equip-
ment. The SOAP program was implemented to aid the ship in validating the
accuracy of its COSAL. This validation and updating of ship's inventory
was accomplished during the regular maintenance overhaul period. Ship's
personnel actually moved repair parts to SOAP teas facilities and conducted

so
a complete inventory of the material. Tine material was identified if
ssary and stock numbers were up-dated us required. The results of
this program included Excess and Deficiency Listings, Frequency of Demand
Listings and what is even more important — improved reliability in ship-
board equipment support. The SOAP prograa originally generated much dis-
pleasure but after an education program instituted by Type Commanders has
grown to be an accepted and integral part of inventory management of ship-
board material.
Zttlitary Essentiality Codinn (H5C) . The advent of operations research
stimulated Navy inventory managers to investigate the construction of
inventory models that could optimize shipboard inventories without the
variable factor of predicted demand. Since the demand factor was an
unknown factor it was believed that a more reliable allowance list could
be constructed if each equipment, component and repair part were assigned
a relative importance. The relative importance was actually the military
worth of an item in regard to the effect it3 absence had on mission
completion. The first allowance lists constructed on the basis of military
t«>rth were the Fleet Ballistic Submarines COSAL's. The effect of equip-
ment, component or part availability was considered to weigh the military
essentiality of the item in relation to its effect on the ship's mission
accomplishment. The COSAL was prepared and a Military Essentiality Code
was assigned to each allowance list item. The success of this coding
stimulated the Navy to implement MSC on a fleet-wide basis. A pilot pro-
gram was instituted but did not achieve ^ected results. The imple-
mentation of this particular HEC was never completed.
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The assigning of Military Essentiality was attempted using a dif-
ferent technique a;id philosophy. The interrelation of shipboard systems
was compiled in terms of series of readiness indices . This program was
oaplished by a contractor and indices were constructed for • few ships




MAJOR PROGRAMS AFTER AUGUST, 1964
Supply Support of the Opera tiar, Forces
On 27 August 1964, the Chief of Naval Operations prescribed a
Supply Support Policy for the entire fleet. This section is devoted to
an analysis of this policy and all quotations are taken from this in-
struction.*
The area of shipboard inventories and the policies concerning
their parameters had never been consolidated into one standard doctrine.
The policies and procedures involved had varied between Atlantic and
Pacific Fleets, and uithin the respective iileots various standards and
guidelines differed between Type Companders in the same fleet. It was
within this environment of individuality that shipboard material manage-
ment had evolved. The basic objective of this Supply Support Policy was
to ensure standard guidelines and terminology throughout the fleet in re-
gard to shipboard material readiness. This definitive policy 1ms cleared
tiie air and caused a revolution, in that all efforts in improving the reli«
ability of shipboard support are now channeled down the same path and are
not pulling in the many directions thay had previously travelled.
Department of the Navy, Office of the Chief of Naval Operations,





The purpose of this CNO Instruction was to set forth the basic
Navy policy governing:
. . . tiie determination of fleet material re juiremeats, fleet
asset distribution, and prescribe the shipboard endurance neces-
sary to achieve the desired standards of logistic readiness and
endurance of the Operating Forces.
The concept on which this Supply Support Policy was based was that:
Under combat conditions the only assured supply to the fleet
way be limited to the material carried by individual ships, the
mobile logistic support forces and positioned at overseas bases.
The total resources carried in individual ships and in mobile
logistic support forces will consist of allowance list and load
list material required for naval operations in support of the
national policy for the period specified by the Navy Support
Plan (Navy mid-range plan).
Although the Supply Support Policy encompasses the entire supply system
it will be examined as to its effect on the first echelon of supply which
includes individual shipboard allowance lists that are stocked to sustain
independent operations for a pre-daterminad period without external support
The policy defines the second echelon of supply as:
. . g the industrial and resupply material positioned in the mobile
logistic support force and the resupply material positioned at
designated bases in support of actual and planned fleet deployment
for a stated period without augmentation.
In the first echelon of supply the range and depth of material to be car-
ried is clearly stated in terms of days of endurance.
Repair Parts and Equip- Non-equipment related
Efoll
^yP ment Related Consumables Consumables & Provisions
Ships larger than DD 90 days 90 days
DD and Smaller 90 days 45 days




Ships Complements 90 days 90 days
Embarked Troops Not Applicable 60 days
Non-self-sustaining Ships
(Landing Craft, etc.) As Required to Accomplish Assigned Mission
The second echelon of supply was in turn established to support combat
endurance levels of 90 days for all material. Reliance for support was to
be placed on the afloat capabilities of the fleet) using advanced support
bases only when mobile support required supplementation. The Policy spel
out the action required by the various echelons in implementation of this
doctrine. The Chief of Naval Material was charged with coordinating the
development of shipboard allowance lists that would include Military Es-
sentiality Codes and also would be capable of identifying allowance list
items by category, i.e., equipment, equipage, repair parts and consumables.
He was to evaluate supply effectiveness of overall Fleet Supply Support
and take appropriate action to correct deficiencies. The establishment of
criteria for the selection of high value, critical or limited applica-
tion items to be distributed to each fleet on a restricted basis was under
his cognisance* In addition the Chief of Naval Material would continue to
provide program management and support to the Supply Operation Assistance
Program (SOAP).
The Fleet Commanders were directed to utilise shipboard allowance
lists a3 the basic stocking authority at the shipboard level and were
given the authority to authorise excess of allowance loading of ships for
operations where the mobile logistic support forces or other means of
replenishment were not available. They were to police the utilisation,
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maintenance, and validation of allowance lists and take corrective action
where required. The Fleet Commander was to provide support requirements
to the Chief of Naval Material for utilization in allowance list prepara-
tion. In this regard they were required to institute a data collection
system including usage and demand data gathered from fleet units that
would assist in allowance list preparation and update.
The Chief of Naval Operations directed the Fleet Commanders to
enforce allowance list discipline to ensure that authorized levels of
shipboard stock were not exceeded. They were to continue to conduct the
Supply Operations Assistance Program (SOAP) and advise the Chief of Naval
Material as to the adequacy of fleet support.
The Criteria for Shipboard Allowances were spelled out: The first
criterion defined the content of shipboard allowance lists. Allowance
lists would describe and establish allowed quantities of equipment, com-
ponents, equipage and repair parts and other materials required in the
direct support of the ship to ensure its self-sufficiency (equipment
related consumables) . The material described in shipboard allowances
represented the First Echelon of Supply. The second and most important
criterion stated:
Shipboard allowance lists are mandatory as to range and depth
of stock carried. Existing directives ttfhich conflict with this
policy will be revised.
The various policies of lype Commanders were cancelled by this explicit
statement. There could no longer be any known allowance list deficiencies
on board a ship and this in turn stressed the importance of an accurate
and up-to-date COSAL. For the first time the shipboard allowance list was
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recognised as a document or stature that could no longer be looked upon
with casual concern. This was a milestone in the history of shipboard
inventory management. This polic, ta limited leeway by the third
criterion which allowed ships to load material in-excess of their allowa:
lists only with approval of the cognizant Typo Commander or in his absence
by the Senior officer Present Afloat <SO?A). These approvals would be
valid for an interim *> xnd if long range planning required these In-
excess materials would be added to the ship's allowance list. If an allow-
ance change were considered necessary the proposed change was to be submitted
by the originating ship to the cognizant T ian, via the Type
Commander, with a copy to t&fl appropriate inventory ma. The statement
of Criteria for Shipboard Allowances forth uirad that tlse allowance
of repairs parts and other directly supporting equipment related consum-
ables would be stored under the bin-drawer ;t. This had the effect |
re jUiring all ships to adopt the central storeroom concept of shipboard
supply. Under this concept all allowance 1". arial was kept under the
custody and control of the ship's Supply Officer. In the past only larger
ships had been re aiired to use central storeroom procedures; now every ship
in the fleet would be required to adopt this system. AddiL :y, the
criteria made clear that shipboard allowance lists would be responsive to
changes in demand resulting from approved data collection programs and, as
Intmun, shipboard allowances would be xsd and revised at the time
of maintenance overhaul. These revisions would reflect the most accurate
demand or usage e:q>arience available to the allowance preparing activities*
In viet? of this re ^uirement the Supply Operations Assistance Program would
be continued concurrently with shipyard overhauls to refine inventories.
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up-date inventory records and identify material deficiencies and/or execs
Application of the criteria was extended to the development of ship-
board allowance lists . Demand Based Items were those items having a pre-
dicted usage of at least one unit in 90 days for all installations aboard
ship. Demand Based Items and Equipment Belated Consumables meeting this
usage criterion had to be stocked in such a manner as to achieve stock ef-
fectiveness, the filling of on-board demands, of at least 90 per cent for
a period of 90 days. This acock level was to be predicted on the combat
consumption rates whenever such rates could be ascertained. As a rule of
thumb the combat consumption rate for most items was one and one-half the
normal consumption rate. Insurance Items were those items which do not
have a predicted usage on board ship of at least one unit in 90 days. Only
those Insurance Items considered vital to the support of a ship's primary
mission (s), or to the safety and welfare of shipboard personnel would be
included in the allowance list. These vital Insurance Items would be al-
lowed to a minimum depth, either unity or a minimum replacement unit. In-
surance Items not included above and with no usage reflected for a period
of two years would be eliminated from shipboard allowance lists. This
stringent constraint on Insurance Items would greatly reduce their number
in shipboard stock over the next few years.
In the future, shipboard allowance lists would be coded to identify
items of equipment, equipage, repair parts or eqttifNMtt related consumables
and also indicate the degree of management control required aboard ship,
i.e., inventory frequency and custody signature requirements. Shipboard
Supra, p. 6.

allowance lists would also be coded to reflect the military essentiality
of each it.
The Supply Support Policy of the Operating Forces laid the first
fleetwide foundation, in definitive terms, for the building of an inte-
grated Navy wide system of shipboard inventory management . The policy has
.in the springboard for many important programs that, in the end, will
achieve the objective of optimisation of shipboard inventories.
Interim Programs
Fleet Logistics Support Improvement Program (FLSIP) . This program \
established in August 1964 to resolve the problem of maintaining balanced
ready Naval Force capable of performing assigned missions in the face of
steadily increasing costs resulting from technological advances and the use
of mora costly sophisticated systems. Under the FLSIP program, the duty of
the Chief of Naval Material was to coordinate the development of new al-
lowance lists that would reflect the Supply Support Criteria of the Chief
of Naval Operation *1 Supply Support Policy. The Chief of Naval Material
directed the technical bureaus (now renamed and hereafter referred to as
material bureaus) to initiate implementation of this program. FLSIP' s ulti-
mate objective was the publishing of shipboard allowance lists which reflect
the Supply Support Criteria.
Under the FLSIP program, Military Essentiality Code3 will be as-
signed to every installed equipment/com? This MSC will define the
importance of the item in relation to the mission of the ship. The develop-
ment of the MEC at the equipment/component to ship level will be accompli.
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by the Bureau of Ships, the Bureau of Weapons (a consolidation of the
Bureaus of Mr and Ordnance) and the Fleet. The processing, incorporation
into computer records and dissemination of information to the fleet will
be accompl ished by the Bureau of Supp >unts. The Allowance
Parts Lists (APL) will be developed to include the following information
relating to the maintenance i.;licics of the i of Ships and the Bureau
of Weapons:
(1) MEC of thv. to the equipment or component.
(2) A Kair.i which defines the level at whi
tee if to be perfor .e., Ship, Teuc
Store Activity.
(3) The minimum replacement unit, i.e., each set.
(4) The planned maintenance requirement.
To achieve this objective of the FLSIP will require the development and
recording of 14 million individual part level decisions covering 205,000
different APL's.^ In view of the huge scope of this decision making
process the Bureau of Supplies and Accounts intends to follow • Lead-
Follow concept. In excess of 3000 Lead APL*s will be constructed covering
generic groupings of equipments. These LEAD APL*s will be distributed to
the Bureau of Ship.-; managed activities (Naval Shipyards) who will define
the inancu policy in terms of the four elements cited above. These
decisions will be analy ually ant tated by the Ships Part
Control Center to all applicable future APT.
Military Essentiality Codes are to be obtained at the equipment to
3$ata extracted from Bureau of Supplies and Accounts Progi
Change Proposal, subsiuted on February 25, 1965, X p. 3.
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component to ship's hull level. Approximately 800 COSAI* Indices » one for
each hull, have been provided by the cognisant Inventory Control Poi
(Inventory Managers) to selected Bureau o£ Ships and Bureau o£ Weapons
Managed activities . The aim of these activ is to assign vital or
non-vital decisions to each equipment or component listed in the indices
according to their essentiality to the primary mission of i iip as
specified in the Supply Support Policy. At the conclusion of this cod-
process, a joint Bureau/Type Cororaander review of tiic military essentiality
det tions will be made. The Chief of Naval Operations will participate
in this review, on an exception basis, to resolve differences of opinion.
The approved hull iiidices will then be forwarded to the Inventory Control
Points where MSC (vital, non-vital) decisions will bti Icaypunched and
entered into magnetic tape records as one o£ tita additional data elemo ..
ulrcd in the preparation of the new COSAI.' s.
The completion of FL3IP wa3 scheduled in Fiscal Year 1966. It is
doubtful that completion will be on schedule but the program and its in-
herent benefit in terms of improved shipboard allowance lists and material
management will be available to the fleet in the near future. FbSIP is
the most elaborate and comprehensive of tiia interim programs. However, it
alone could not accomplish all ctives set fi< la the
Supply Support Policy.
Hlsh Value Account inr. System (KIVAC) . In compliance with the Supply
Support Policy, the Chief of Naval Material directed the Bureau of Supplies
and Accounts to establish criteria for the selection of high value, criti
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or limited application items to be given restricted distribution in support
of each fleet. There had been little or no usage or demand data generated
or accumulated to reflect stock movement of high value items. Therefore,
the Bureau of Supplies and Accounts directed the Inventory Managers to
prepare a listing of high value items under their cognisance. The value
of an included item was in general about 500 dollars or more. These listings
were prepared and distributed to the fleet. The ships were required to
make a one time inventory of their stock and report the quantities of high
value items that were in their storerooms . They were then required to
make monthly reports to the cognizant Inventory Managers on the issue of
any high value item. This was the beginning of a usage accumulation of
high value items and will be the basis for forthcoming stocking policies
for these items
.
Deficiencies In Allowance Lists (DIAL) The importance of budgetary con-
siderations cannot be overemphasised in any discussion of shipboard in-
ventory management. The Fleet Commanders have complained to the budgeting
echelons within the Department of Defense that they have not been allowed
sufficient funds with which to procure shipboard inventories . Prior to
the Support Policy the Navy had not been able to justify increased funding
for procurement of shipboard material . The lack of data reflecting in-
ventory value, demand and usage data reduced these requests for increased
funds to an emotional plea. Under the Department of Defense's programmed
budget concept, emotion was not enough to win an increase in funds. The
forthcoming implementation of the Support Policy would not produce the
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required factual data required to support increased funding requests for
at least two years. In the interim the ship's allowances were deficient
in aany aspects . These deficiencies we; - ussed in general but tlierc
was no consolidation in the Navy of the exact quantity and cost of these
deficiencies
.
The Cliia£ of Naval operations emplamented a one time "crash"
program. It requested that all Havy ships prep -d submit requisitions
for all allowance list deficiencies. S3 • the Deficiency ia allowance
List Program known as DIAL* The ships wara ^iven only two weeks to prepare
Ir DIAL requisitions and then the requisitions were submitted to
selected supply activities for compilation. Hie result of the DIAL program
was that for the first time all deficiencies la shipboard allowances were
known and, in effect, on order. The only stumbling block was the lack of
funds required to procure the material, Tlie hard-core data available to
the Chief of .ions was used in acquiring an increase in funds,
although not sufficient to procure ail deficiencies, enabling -tial
procu.. of the shipboard t acias. The ;e ia funding was
proportionately alloc i/pa Coesaanders and they in turn decided
on what allowance defici t toix ships could procur,.
The Three "S"Prograas (SOAP. SAVE, SHIR) . The Supply Operations Assistance
Program is by no means an interim program. It is included in this section
only because it has fathered two interim programs that may someday become
as permanent as their pare*;
SOAP records pertain to a program of periodic supply overiiauls for
every Havy ship. Through SOAP, storeroom inventories of repair parts are
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brought up to the level of material readiness prescribed by the Chief o£
ilaval Operations. During supply overhauls, ships turn in excess parts
and requisition other parts to fill tea. Under this procedure,
any requisitions for deficient parts result in charges to the Type Com-
manders' allotments, while many turn*ins generate a credit to the same
allotments. Many times a ship of the Type Command is requisitioning
deficiencies that arc chargeable while concurrently a sister ship under
the same Type Command is taming in taNN tlie first one is ordering.
This places an unnecessary drain on the Type Commander's already stringent
funds.
The Shortages and valuable Excesses (SAVE) pi is designed to
remedy this situation. Since SOAP determines deficient and excess supply
quantitic each ship, it is a natural step to compile selected data
into a aaster SAVE file of deficiencies for screening against the excesses
as they are generated. This permits a redistribution of excess parts
among ships to satisfy the shortages of tilt MM items in other ships of
the same Type Command. The funds are no longer wasted in unnecessary
procurement.
The Ship's liistory and Inventory Kecoi-d (31131) program will receive
information gathered as a by-product of the SOAP/SAVE programs. Navy
inventory managers have been directed to commence SHXR files, which will
include allowance, inventory and usage figures for each repair part in a
ship's allowance. The SHIR data will axe the inventory managers in budget
a
planning and fleetwide control of repair part support.
_-
"3 'S' Program," The Pacific Supply Letter , published monthly
by C in C Pacific Fleet, Ko. 254, November 1%5, p. 5.

Afloat Supply Information System. Among his responsibilities, the Fleet
Commander is required by the Supply Support Policy to implement a U3a3c
and demand data collecting system from fleet units to be used in the
preparation of allowance lists.
The Afloat Supply Information System was developed jointly by
Commanders of the Service Forces of the Atlantic and Pacific Fleets.
Acting as logistic agents for their respective Fleet Commanders, they
agreed upon thi ~eei that will require ships to submit all copies of
their consumption documents, Budget Reports and Quarterly Supply Status
Bsports to a data processing activity. These documents will be processed
by the computer and the output will be used by the Type Comoanders to
measure the supply readiness and effectiveness of an individual ship. With
this data, the Type Commander can more effectively allocate funds by having
available current consumption rates and up-to-date deficiency information.
The availability of this data will enable the Type Commander to prepare
more meaningful budgets. The ships will receive summarising reports of
their consumption and spending rates in conparison with other ships of
their type • This system was Implemented on 25 Pacific and 25 Atlantic
Fleet Destroyer Type Ships on a trial basis. The trial period concluded
on December 31, 1965 and the success or failure of this system will depend
on the results achieved. If successful, this system will become a perman-
ent program.**
The programs described in this section are the major interim
^Pacific Briefs, Afloat Supply Information System, 55 Haw Supply
Corps Newsletter. SXVXIX, Mb* 11, Ifovember 1965, p. 26.
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programs implemented to achieve the object! t forth ia the Supply
Support Policy. These programs are the oast prominent but are by no means
inclusive of all such interim programs. Many "one-shot" programs are
being implemented by varying echelons in the ESavy that are required to
accumulate a basic data base from which tlie Optimum Allowance List can
be built.
Pronram Objectives
Tlie Optimum COSAL . Hie Supply Support Policy and the programs that it
has spawned are all directed toward improving the material readiness of
Wavy ships at 3ea. The major programs previously described are a means
of gathering input in order to provide an output that will enable the
Havy to construct an Optimum COSAL.
The format of the Optimum COSAL will be similar to that of the
present edition. The Optimum COSAL will be divided into three parte.
Part I is the lade*: and in addition to the three sections will have an
MSC for each Shipment and Component. Part II, the Allowance Parts List
(APL*s) will, in addition to the present data portrayed, have a maintenance
code, a part S3BC, a minimum replacement unit and a planned maintenance
requirement. Part III, the Stock Uumber Sequence Listing, will include
the FSW or liinufacturer ' s Part Ilurabcr, the item name, the Component Iden-
tification Numbers (CID's) applicable, notes, unit of issue, allowed
atity, total ship's population per CID number, &EC, supply management




In order to include all this information and to assure continued
allowance list accuracy, a continuous flow of input data reflecting demand
and usage characteristics oust he available. The Supply Support Policy
has directed that all echelons in the operational and logistic chain of
command institute cogent data collection systems . This is being ac-
complished. The ability to review comprehensive data prior to procurement
of repair parts will enable the supply system to more accurately choose
between existing alternatives and ensure that the system can support the
demands of the fleet. The more accurate demand characteristics available
will lend themselves to application of more sophisticated inventory
control techniques. Techniques such as the probability theory applied to
inventory control can be more easily utilized by the Navy Supply System
to optimize system support of fleet demands . The techniques employed in
operations research to construct inventory models, dynamic models under
conditions of certainty, such as the Optimal Policy Curve' can now be used
to improve access of the inventory managers to the data describing the
variables of the shipboard inventory problems.
The policies and criteria laid down by the Chief of Naval Opera-
tions in the Supply Support of the Operating Forces will undoubtedly im-
prove the status of shipboard material support. The problems to be solved
in determination of on-board repair parts are being solved. The six
Edward U. Smykay, Donald J. Bowersox, Frank II. Mossman, Physical
Distribution Management (New York: The Macmillan Company, 1961), p. 98.
7
Martin K. Starr and David W. Miller, Inventory Control: Theory
and Practice (Englewood Cliffs, N. J.: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1962), p. 93.
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major problems in this area were enumerated by Rear Admiral H. J. Goldberg,
Chief of the Bureau of Supplies and Accounts, in a speech delivered
November 15, 1965 to the Pentagon Shipbuilding Study Group. These problems
were outlined thus:
1. Timely and Complete Component Identification . Pretty clearly,
on-board parts determinations should be completed well before the
ship has completed construction — so that time is allowed for docu-
mentation of all the decisions and delivery of documentation to the
ship and so that stowage and arrangement of repair parts on-board can
be accomplished before the ship sails. Also, if all of the inputs to
the repair parts determination are to be developed on time, installed
or to be installed components must be precisely Identified and de-
scribed in detail long before the repair parts determination.
For numbers of reasons, chief of which is the way we build and
plan the building of ships, it does not happen that way. Even in the
case of the Polaris Submarines, this input is always incomplete when
the subs go to sea lacking supporting repair parts which should be
on-board. We look forward hopefully to the FDL's.
The Fast Deployment Logistic Ship (FDL) is the first ship to be designed,
contracted and constructed on a "package concept." The Department of
Defense decided to procure 10 of these ships under the same procurement
concept as applied to aircraft* The manufacturer awarded the contract
is responsible for the entire construction of the ship and is also required
to provide repair part support for a period of years under the contract.
This coordinates and consolidates the ship and its support into a "package"
that should eliminate the problem of timely and complete component
identification.
a
Rear Admiral H. J. Goldberg, SC, USN, Combatant Ships On-Board
Repair Parts, Navy Department, Chief, Bureau of Supplies and Accounts,




2. Component Standardization, Within and Among Ships . Let me
simply state that, in the pa3t and for the most part, each separ
hull has represented a prototype as viewed from our hull to component
files. In the case of Hull, tfachanical and Electrical Components
installed in our ships, we are supporting 175,000 distinct components.
About 23% of them have an installed population of one, i.e., in only
one ship. An additional 41% have an installed population between
2 and 9, and 36% have a population of 10 or greater. In the case of
on-board repair parts determinations, this situation represents a
problem because with each new hull we start largely from scratch in
building the automated files. And of course this also means more
different repair parts to manage — to store on-board — and to
finance*. As an aside, but possibly more of a problem, you can well
Imagine the little back-up support we can afford to lay down ashore
for components of small fleet population, particularly when most
repair parts are infrequently required. Again, we look forward to
the FDL's.9
The third problem is directly related to problem 2.
3. Demand Pattern for Ships Repair Parts . The infrequency of
demand for most component repair parts represents a problem, all by
itself. Because of this fact of life, budget reviewers know that as
few as fifteen to twenty per cent of a given ship's on-board repair
parts range will be used between overhauls. The trick, of course,
is to know what fifteen per cent will be used on what deployment.
But the picture makes reviewers loath to give the fleets sufficient
funds to maintain their allowance of repair parts. The picture
makes the reviewers even more loath to grant funds for even limited
ahoreside, back-up stocks of such items, hence, more and more when
the ships need such a part which they haven't been able to maintain
on-board, it is not in shore stocks, either'.-''*'
4. Sophisticated, untested and unstable Equipments . Another way
to state the fourth problem area is 'we seem always to lead the state
of technological art in our demand for better equipment capability
on-board ship.' Tha only way other to state it would be to say that
we do not make our contractors deliver reliable equipments — most of
them are still in development and with unreliable components when we
install and start supporting them. As a consequence., x*e are unable
to estimate reasonable parts replacement rates for the first con-
figurations and unable to keep up with the alteration fixes as they
are accomplished, one upon the other.**
10





This is a plea for installing only those equipments that are thoroughly
tested and proven in Navy ships.
• Qualified Maintenance Personnel . I raise the problem,
perhaps redundantly, because it frequently is masked as a problem
of on-board or back-up repair parts short.: . Maintenance plans
and replacement factors are premised upon availability of qualified
personnel. The premise too often is a bad one. 2.2
The sixth problem delineated by Rear Admiral Goldberg is actually a
measurement of tiie progress of the Bureau of Supplies and Accounts in
implementing their tasks as defined in ll :.c Supply Support Policy.
6. Covered for Specific Inputs to the Determination Process .
For all ships and for all types of components, we are still up to
two years away from being supplied by the responsible engineering
authorities, the necessary special technical inputs, particularly
Military Essentiality and Maintenance Codes .... We expect to
gat there 1. 4"*
The problems of shipboard inventory management today are the same
as in the past. Today, however, and in the near future these problems
can and shall be solved. The concern and interest in the state of
material readiness in terms of on-board supply support is no longer a
"supply problem" — it is a Navy problem. The realisation of the scope
of the problem has opened the resource flood gates of the entire Navy and
directed attention and action on solving the problem of optimization of
shipboard resources.
The issuance of the doctrine of Supply Support of the Operating




Ibid .» p. 81.
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in coordinated policy statement concerning shipboard material support.
This support policy clearly stated policies and criteria for Navy-wide
compliance in implementing standa. prograsas to improve shipboard
material readiness. Prior to the issuance o£ this policy, guidelines
and criteria concerning shipboard allowances and their management varied
between Atlantic and Pacific Fleets and within respective fleets with
specific Type Command doctrine. Fleet-wide endurance levels were clearly
stated in days and were applicable in all instances. The COSAL was
specified as a mandatory document. All list limits could only be
clianged by the Type Commander and then only on an interim basis. The Chief
of Naval : -a .'.-rial and the Type Commanders under the Fleet Commanders were
assigned tasks and the entire Navy was coordinated in improving the stata
shipboard material readiness.
In compliance with the policy, arious echelons within the
Naval establishment embarked on interim programs to accomplish the require-
ments laid down by the Chief of liava.L Operations. The Fleet Logistics
Improvement Program (FLSIP) was the most important of these programs. The
duty of the Chief of Naval Material under the FLSIP was to coordinate the
development of new allowance lists that would reflect the Supply Support
Criteria. The High Value Accounting System (lilVAC), the Deficiencies in
Allowance Lists (DIAL) program and the Three !SS" programs were all con-
ceived as was the Afloat Supply Information System to aid in construction
of this new allowance lis .
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The programs objectives were to accumulate data and establish
permanent systems of informational input to make this new allowance list
an Gptiaun C05AL,
Tiic basic problems in ship construction, equipment procurement and
implementation of the new systems will require at least two years before




In Chapter X the parameters of the problem Of inventor/ laanageueut
o£ shipboard material were explored as a three part discussion . 'The ship
in itself was a contributor to the problem due to the policies required of
The Navy Departiaeut in contracting for ship construction. The practice of
competitive bidding with the lowest bidder winning the contract based on
performance atandar Ilowed ships and their installed equipments
to be standardised. sets of standardisation has increased the re^uirc-
oonfc for the supply system to carry repair parts in support of a few equip-
ments. Within stringent budgetary constraints funds are expanded on parts
peculiar to one ha m optimisation of system inventory could be ac-
complished with thosa funds by procurement of repair parts la support of
larger popu IfA at !a*feaXl*tiM*« Am ship also creates a
problem by Its cm iality to the m salon of the Navy in re-
quiring on-board ctoc. i are carried only as insurance
items and oi»t bacae demand or usage criteria. insurance
itat. ly and in themselves constitute the bulk
of monetary inwutment in shipboard stock, Their turn-over rate is non-
existent «
The basic polic ipboar reion prevents standard-




support systems peculiar to individual ships. The Department of Defense,
in ordering the construction of the Fast Deployment Logistic ship (FDL),
has changed the construction policy. Ships of the FDL type will be pro-
cured on a "package" basis whereby the contractor is required to plan,
design, construct and provide repair support for a long term period. This
"package" procurement has proved successful in aircraft construction and
if successful in ship construction will be instrumental in solving this
part of shipboard support problem.
The ship's personnel is the second aspect o£ the overall problem
in the operation of the informal supply system aboard ship. The formal
shipboard supply system, under the cognisance of the ship's supply
officer, is charged with the responsibility of maintaining shipboard
inventories in accordance with the allowance list to support the ship in
a state of readiness and self-sufficiency to accomplish any assigned
mission. The tempo of operations during World War II and the lack of
importance attached to allowance list maintenance by a ship's company
found the formal shipboard supply systoa in a state of chaos at the end of
the war. The informal supply system, always a factor in shipboard life,
grew in size due to the failure of the formal system and the desire of the
crew to accomplish their tastes for the good of the ship. This informal
system is a series of pyramiding storerooms commencing at the individual
level and progressing through departmental echelons to the department
head. These storerooms contain material received from the formal system
and also include material acquired on the Navy grey market by bartering
coffee and other prized commodities in return for repair parts and
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consumable material to be stored in the informal system. The formal
system does not record the usage and demand of the informal system and
when the ship is absent from the sources of supply both systems fail to
produce the required repair part. Mission degradation is the result,
although the intentions of all shipboard personnel were exactly the
opposite.
The informal supply system in a ship can never be wholly elim-
inated nor should it. However, the formal supply system must be the
source of supply for the informal system, /accurate records kept of all
issues made to shipboard departments watcher from ship's storerooms or
directly from the store establishment will reduce the harm imposed on
material readiness by cue informal system. The current attention and
policy controls imposed on Navy ships are underlining the importance of
accurate demand and uoa^u data. The improved statistics improve the
content of the allowance lists and thence the support rendered to the
ship by the formal system. The improved support will bring about a
lessening, by ship's personnel, of dependence on the informal system and
the bartering will abate. This aspect of the overall problem can be
solved and is being solved by current Uavy Supply Support Doctrine.
The third aspect of the problem, that of the complexity of
organization, and the flow of directives from this complex descending
upon the ship in an avalanche of conflicting policies can not so easily
be resolved. The requirements of the various echelons differ, therefore
their logistic policies differ. A reorganisation of the Navy is not
feasible. However, it would not be too difficult for all directives
requiring support action from a ship to be routed directly to the Type
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Commands . These Type Commands could Chen consolidate the requirements
and pass them on to the ship in one package. This would not be too
difficult to accomplish.
Chapters II and III described the various major programs prior to
and following the issuance of the doctrine of Supply Support of the
Operating Forces by the Chief of Naval Operations in August 1964. In
Chapter II the problems encountered due to the format of the shipboard
allowance lists were discussed. The variance of allowance list construc-
tion by the responsible Technical Bureaus as to philosophy and format
was considered a handicap to proper shipboard inventory management. A
new allowance list was introduced that coordinated ail the different
allowance lists into one format. This was known as the Coordinated Ship-
board Allowance List (COSAL). It was a major breakthrough in simplifying
material management afloat. In conjunction with the COSAL the Supply
Operations Assistance Program (SOAP) was implemented and this program
ensured that the COSAL would accurately reflect up-to-date equipments
.iring on-board support. The SOAP program is now considered an in-
tegral part of tlie supply support system. It is also the source of
demand and usage data, shipboard excesses and shortages and provides the
base necessary for continued optimum shipboard support.
The most controversial program was the Military Essentiality
Coding program. The MEC was thought to be necessary to give relative
weight to shipboard equipments, components and repair parts in the absence
of usage data. HSC was first used in the construction of Polaris equipped
submarines (SSBN) allowance lists. The success of this coding caused an
effort to be implemented co code all Navy allowance lists in a similar
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fashion. This M£C program was to be done at the shipboard level . An
immediate resistance to the program came from the fleet. The basic fear
of the MEC program by the fleet was justified. The fleet had been
suffering under stringent budgetary constraints in all areas. The area
of supplies and equipage was particularly vulnerable to budgetary cuts.
The Navy in the past had not been able to justify their supplies and
equipage requirements to the satisfaction of the Secretary of Defense.
Therefore every year a little more money had been sliced from this allo-
cation from which the material for shipboard support was purchased. The
introduction of MEC appeared to be a budgetary control and not an inven-
tory management tool . It was quite obvious to the fleet that a budgetcer
could look at only the material coded as essential and fund only for that
material . Under the guidelines of the MEC program only those equipments
and components essential to the mission of the ship were to be given a
high code. The fleet could forsee that under this program at least two-
thirds of the shipboard allowance would be coded as non-essential and
would be wide open to a budgetary am* These were the conditions under
which the MEC test was conducted. The results of this particular program
were not definitive. The correlation between similar type ships was
poor. The per cent of essential items was high. The MEC under these
guidelines never proceeded to fleetwide application.
Tiie issuance of the Navy-wide Supply Support Policy by the Chief
of Naval Operations took into account ail these basic problems. The
doctrine established policy, endurance levels, and criteria for shipboard
material. The allowance list was made a mandatory document and no longer
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could be looked upon as a general guide. Endurance in tenas of days %taa
standardised fleet-wide , although it was still not clear how a ship could
calculate what quantity of a repair part could be established as a 90>day
supply. Endurance levels were not clearly defined but guidance was
offered in that all endurance levels were to be calculated in terets of
combat consumption rates and these were generally one and one half tines
normal consumption rat .. BC coding was to be a way of life. The coding
Tjould be accomplished under the direction ox the Technical Buraaur. and
the code would simply Indicate that the e ,uip w vital or non-vital
to the mission of the ship. Demand Based Items were defined as were
insurance Items. Insurance Items that did not register demand in a two-
year period would be removed from the allowance list: unless the Insurance
Item was coded vital or was vital to the safety and welfare of the ship's
personnel. All echelons were directed to institute data collection
systems reflecting all aspects of stock behavior and these statistics
ware to be coordinated with the allowance preparation activities and the
cognizant inventory managers. The objective of this policy was to create
an Optimum C06AL constructed to include all data pertinent to efficient
and dependable Inventory Management of Shipboard Material. The Havy
would eventually have a coordinated system of supply support based on
up-to-date inventory management techni tuea and improving the material
readiness of the fleet.
The completion of this objective is in sight. Upon its completion
the Navy will be better equipped to support its ships over long periods
of deployment and at vast distances from sources of supply. The number of

78
equipment failures caused by lack of cm-board support material will
eventually be reduced to a minimum but never to extinction. The improve-
ments are coming and, indeed, many are already here. The future of ship-
board material readiness is in good hands*
.
APPENDIX
GLOSSARY OF ORGANISATIONS AND TERMS
Bureau of Ships — A Technical Bureau (Management Bureau) respon-
sible for planning, designing, procurement and repair part provisioning
of ships and their complete installed equipments.
Bureau of Supplies and Accounts — A Technical Bureau (Management
Bureau) responsible for all facets of Inventory Control, distribution and
stockage, in the Navy Supply System, of repair parts, consumables and
ipage in support of installed shipboard equipments
.
Bureau of Weapons — A Technical Bureau (Management Bureau) re-
sponsible for planning, designing, procurement and repair part provisioning
of aircraft and weapons systems and their complete installed equipments.
Bureau of Yards and Docks — A Technical Bureau (Management Bur-
responsible for the management and support of Navy owned or operated Real
Estate and in addition is responsible for procurement and distribution of
all automotive equipment.
Chief o£ Naval Material — >onsible to the Chief of Naval
Operations for overall logistic (except personnel) support for the Naval
Establishment. The Management Bureaus report to him*
Chief of Naval Operations — The Senior Naval Officer , a member
of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, responsible to the Secretary of the Navy
for the operation and readiness of the fleet and the Naval Establishment.
-'ansa Supply Afteacy — Responsible for the Inventory Management,
procurement, sto and distribution of repair parts, consumabl
equipage, and clothing common to all branches of the Department of Defense.
The Defense Supply System is composed of Inventory Managers in charge of
Inventory Control Points under the Director of the Defense Supply Agency.
The Director reports directly to the Secretary of Defen:
Fleet Commander -- (Titled Commander in Chief, Atlantic or Pacific
Fleet) is responsible to the Chief of Naval Operations for the overall
readiness of his respective fleet.
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- iuus for which there nay he occasional inter-
mittent demands not sufficiently repetitive to warrant classification as
regular stock items; but for which prudence requires that a nominal quantity
be stocked for the reason that the essentiality of the items and the lead
tine required to obtain such items by purchase would create an unacceptable
situation if no stock were carried.
Inventory Henafwment — is that phase of military logistics which
controls the input, availability and disposal of material in the Naval
Establishment.
Inventory lianaixer — (Inventory Control Point) — under the msnage-
nsnt control of the Chief, Bureau of Supplies and Accounts is assigned
responsibility for the inventory management of specified items or categories
of items identified by cognisance symbols. Program and supply support
assignments are made jointly by the Bureau of Supplies and Accounts and the
technical Bureau having cognisance. (Examples of ICP*s are: the Ship's
Part Control Center, Electronic Supply Officer and the Aviation Supply
Office.)
Item — A generic term meaning any or all of the species of material.
It is sometimes used with a modifier to mean a particular sub-classification.
8m Material.
Material — All items necessary for the equipment, maintenance,
operations and support of military activities without distinction as to
their application for administrative or combat purposes. Material is a
generic term which is sub-classified as follows:





1. Part — One piece, or two or more pieces Joined together
(a component) which are not normally subject to disassembly
without destruction of designed use.
2. Sub-Assembly — Two or more parts which form a portion of an
assembly or a unit replaceable as a whole, but having a pert
or component which are Individually replaceable.
3. Assembly — A number of parts, components or sub-assemblies,
or any combination thereof, joined together to perform a
specific function.
4. Equipment — All articles of a capital nature needed to outfit
an individual or a ship (organisation).
5. System,-- (General) A combination of parts,, components, sub-
assemblies, assemblies and equipments joined together to
perform a specific operational function or functions.

.1
Provisioning — is the process of determining the range and depth
of iteas (i.e., repair parts, special tools, test equipment and other
equipage and consumables) required to support and maintain an item for
an initial period of service. Its phases include the identification of
items of supply, the establishment of data for catalog, technical manual,
and allowance list preparation, and the preparation of instructions to
assure delivery of necessary support items with related end articles.
Secretary of Defense — A member of the President's Cabinet and
senior civilian in charge of the Department of Defense and responsible to
the President for the overall defense posture.
Secretary of the Navy — Responsible to the Secretary of Defense
for overall readiness of the Naval Establishment.
Type Commander — is responsible for the operational and material
readiness of ships assigned to him by class, type or similarity of mission
to the Fleet Commander. The Type Commander schedules and conducts opera-
tional training, maintenance, overhauls, supply overhauls (SQAP's) and
sets policies and criteria for accomplishment of overall operational and
material readiness of assigned ships. In addition the Type Commander is
the source of funds for his ships to procure allowance list material
(repair parts, consumables, equipage) in support of installed e
t
uipment.
(An example of Type Commander is Commander Naval Air (Atlantic or Pacific),
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